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Abstract
We study nonzero-sum stochastic switching games. Two players compete for mar-
ket dominance through controlling (via timing options) the discrete-state market regime
M . Switching decisions are driven by a continuous stochastic factor X that modulates
instantaneous revenue rates and switching costs. This generates a competitive feedback
between the short-term fluctuations due to X and the medium-term advantages based on
M . We construct threshold-type Feedback Nash Equilibria which characterize stationary
strategies describing long-run dynamic equilibrium market organization. Two sequential
approximation schemes link the switching equilibrium to (i) constrained optimal switch-
ing; (ii) multi-stage timing games. We provide illustrations using an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
X that leads to a recurrent equilibrium M∗ and a Geometric Brownian Motion X that
makes M∗ eventually “absorbed” as one player eventually gains permanent advantage.
Explicit computations and comparative statics regarding the emergent macroscopic mar-
ket equilibrium are also provided.
1 Introduction
Dynamic competition under uncertainty has motivated an ongoing stream of literature in
Operations Research and Industrial Organization. It provides a natural generalization from
the classical one-agent optimization problems and hence is applicable in a large variety of
applied settings. In a typical setup, firms aim to maximize their profits while being exposed
to exogenous stochastic shocks and competitive effects. The latter competition is generally
indirect, e.g. through price, and hence leads to non-zero-sum game formulation, as opposed
to the adversarial, zero-sum case. Some examples include: (i) capacity expansion [6]; (ii)
technological innovation and adoption [21]; (iii) market entry [20].
In this paper we focus on a specific class of switching games which are inspired by the
two time-scale feature of many markets. Indeed, dynamic competition is often driven by in-
finitesimal shocks that determine the rapidly fluctuating short-run market conditions. These
fluctuations yield “local” advantage to players. In turn, the firms convert such short-term
effect into a more durable gain through market dominance. For example, advantageous in-
vestment costs in the present can be converted into longer-term capacity gains that will yield
∗Ludkovski is partially supported by NSF-CDSE 1521743.
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a larger market share. Likewise, cheaper R&D costs can be locked-in through technological
edge. The overall model then links exogenous stochastic shocks with the endogenized firms’
decisions to obtain the dynamic equilibrium for the market organization.
This narrative is formalized by considering a “microeconomic” stochastic factor (Xt) that
drives market conditions vis-a-vis the “macroeconomic” market state (Mt) that determines
market power and relative profits of the firms. We then aim to solve for the competitive
equilibrium that determines (Mt) from the evolution of X. Specifically, (Mt) is taken to
be fully controlled by the players through discrete/lumpy actions. In turn the actions are
interpreted as controls available to the players and are affected by the local fluctuations
captured by (Xt). As a result, we consider a dynamic stochastic game with a micro/macro
structure: in the short-term firms treat Mt as fixed and optimize their next action like in
a timing pre-emption game. In the long term, (Mt) is a stationary market regime with
endogenous market dynamics.
The two time-scales link the immediate competitive advantage identified by Xt and the
long-run market organization Mt. In effect, the latter “tracks” Xt: after a sustained period
of advantageous market conditions we expect the respective firm to become dominant. A lag
is naturally introduced due to the fixed investment costs that create an opportunity cost.
The novelty of our setup is to fully integrate this well-known idea within a non-cooperative
game model. Thus, the players continuously compete for market dominance, with their
actions influenced both by the short-term stochastic fluctuations driving Xt and the strategic
preemption/competition effects. We focus on a duopoly that naturally mirrors the two-sided
nature of the up/down market conditions represented by the one-dimensional X and clarifies
the competitive effects of responding to rival actions.
Our methodological interest in this model stems from three different directions. First,
it extends our previous work [2] on multi-stage timing games. In that version, the num-
ber of controls available to the players was a priori restricted; here we consider the more
plausible situation of an infinitely-repeated game. One economic motivation is the capacity
expansion problem under a growing stochastic environment (e.g. demand) X. This yields a
non-stationary model but the ultimate number of aggregate investments is unbounded, and
must be modeled by a switching game. Second, we are interested in a stationary switch-
ing game, where the market undergoes cyclical shocks (in the sense of X being a recurrent
Markov process). We wish to find the endogenous dynamic equilibrium that will mirror this
cyclicality through the strategically adjusted market regime. Describing such a recurrent
stochastic investment-timing competition naturally links to switching duopoly games. Third,
our model is motivated by the desire for tractability while allowing for dynamic cross-effects
due to competition and stochastic shocks. The repeated stationary nature of the competition
allows to remove the time-variable but still maintain the stochastic dynamics. As a result,
the equilibrium structure is intuitive (summarized through switching thresholds) yet brings
novel insights.
The switching game we consider naturally merges the single-agent switching models [7,
17, 9, 4, 24, 27, 22] and the non-zero-sum stopping games [18, 15, 3, 25, 29]. Optimal
switching arises in a number of important applications, and captures the market structure
of a stochastic process (Xt) linked with a controlled regime process (Mt). Most relevant are
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the multi-mode models [26, 27, 19]. In particular, we leverage the related analytical results
about the variational inequalities satisfied by the value functions and the construction of
threshold-type strategies. We also make extensive use of the finite-control approximation
[4] that offers an intuitive way to establish the Dynamic Programming Principle. From the
game-theoretic perspective, switching controls are best approached as multi-stage stopping,
making the respective analysis an essential building block. In turn a non-zero-sum stopping
game requires handling the solution of an optimal stopping problem with an exit constraint
[23, 25, 2]. Together, the above two strands provide the main intuition for the dynamics of
the switching game:
• As a multi-stage sequence of non-zero-sum stopping games;
• As a fixed point of associated best-response (constrained) optimal switching problems.
Through these lens, one may consider further versions by modifying the type of controls avail-
able to the players: path-dependent non-Markovian strategies (viewed via BSDEs); impulse
controls (see [1]); singular controls (see e.g. [11] for optimal switching with singular controls)
and so on.
2 Problem Formulation
We consider two firms, dubbed player i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, competing on the same market. The
macro market state is described by a discrete-state process (Mt) and represents the relative
market dominance of each player. The domain of (Mt) is a finite set M; for simplicity we
consider integer-valued Mt andM = {m,m+1, . . . ,m}. The players exercise switching-type
controls to enhance their market dominance; thus, Player 1 can increase Mt by +1, and Player
2 can decrease Mt by -1. To exercise a switch, player i must pay a cost K
i(Xt,Mt). Note
that a switch by Player 1, followed by a switch by Player 2 completely neutralize each other
and bring the market to its original state. The interpretation of Mt as a relative dominance
can be motivated by taking Mt = M
1
t − M2t , where M it ∈ N represents the production
capacity, or technology level of firm i. Thus, players repeatedly make competing investments
to increase their capacity; investments by Player 1 raise Mt and those by Player 2 lower it.
The assumption that (Mt) only moves between adjacent regimes ∆M = ±1 can be easily
relaxed, see remark 4.
To capture the local fluctuating market condition, we introduce an exogenous diffusion
process (Xt)t≥0 on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), satisfying the stochastic differential equation
(SDE)
dXt = µ(Xt) dt+ σ(Xt) dWt, (1)
where (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion under P. Denote by D := (d, d¯), with −∞ ≤
d < d¯ ≤ +∞, the domain of (Xt) and F := (Ft)t≥0 the natural filtration generated by (Xt).
The coefficients µ : D → R and σ : D → R+ are assumed to ensure a unique strong solution
to (1). Moreover, we assume the boundaries of D are natural, and X is regular in D1.
1Informally this means that starting at any x ∈ D, X will reach any y ∈ D with positive probability, and
d, d¯ cannot be reached in finite time; see Ch. 2 of [5] for detailed exposition.
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Remark 1. More generally, one may take the coefficients µ, σ in (1) to depend on Mt which
presents no technical difficulties beyond heavier notation. We revisit this extension in Section
7.
Players aim to maximize their expected future (discounted) profits on [0,∞) defined
through revenue rates πi’s that are driven by (Xt,Mt). The integrated total profit is then
given by
∫∞
0 e
−rsπi(Xs,Ms)dsminus the net present value of switching costs, see definition 2.4
below. To match the intuition about the role of (Mt), we postulate that: (i) Player 1
(resp. P2) is dominant when Mt > 0 (resp. Mt < 0); (ii) Player 1 (resp. P2) prefers higher
(resp. lower) Xt. The last assumption creates a positive feedback effect between X and
M : as X rises, Player 1 gets more motivated to enhance her market dominance, eventually
triggering her to act and make Mt higher too; when X falls sufficiently Player 2 gains short-
term advantage and moves Mt towards her preferred negative direction.
By way of illustration, we consider the following two representative examples:
Example 2.1 (Mean-reverting Advantage). Local market fluctuations are mean-reverting,
modeled by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dXt = µ(θ −Xt)dt+ σdWt,
with D = R, µ, σ > 0 and θ ∈ R. Thus, the long-run market is stationary and market
organization is expected to undergo a cyclical behavior as X stochastically oscillates around
θ. The players receive constant profit rates based on deterministic profit ladders πim that are
independent of Xt with
π1m < π
1
m+1 and π
2
m > π
2
m+1 ∀m.
Thus, Player 1 maximizes her revenue when Mt is high and Player 2 when Mt is low. In
complement, the present market conditions Xt affect the switching or investment costs. Thus,
when Xt is high/low, K
1 is low/high (K2 is high/low). Economically this could be interpreted
as X representing exchange rate, with dollar-denominated investment costs both for the do-
mestic firm P1 and foreign firm P2. For concreteness, we suppose the switching costs are
exponential in Xt:
Ki(x,m) = ci(m) + αi(m)eβ
i(m)·x, i = 1, 2,
where ci(m), αi(m) > 0, β1(m) < 0 and β2(m) > 0.
Example 2.2 (Long-run Advantage). In the second example we suppose that in the long-
run one player will possess the competitive advantage and become dominant. However, in the
medium-term fluctuations X creates uncertainty in M . This is captured by using a Geometric
Brownian Motion (GBM) for X
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dWt, (2)
with D = (0,+∞), µ ∈ R and σ > 0. The players receive profit rates according to predeter-
mined profit ladders πim as well; for the sake of diversity we use linear switching costs,
Ki(x,m) =
[
ci(m) + βi(m) · x]
+
, i = 1, 2
where β1(m) < 0 and β2(m) > 0.
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2.1 Admissible Strategies
As explained, we view X as an exogenous stochastic risk factor(s), and M as a fully endoge-
nous macro market regime controlled via the joint strategy profile of the two players. Because
Mt affects the profitability of both players and brings a negative externality—as Player 1 profit
rate increases, Player 2 revenue falls—we use a noncooperative game paradigm, with the play-
ers investing while taking into account that the rival will in the future switch back to her
unfavored states. In line with the discrete nature of M we postulate the players adopt timing
strategies. Thus, the strategic interaction between them leads to a non-zero-sum stochastic
switching game.
To define game strategies, we need to introduce some technical constructs needed to
precise closed-loop equilibrium. Informally, closed-loop strategies are based on the history of
(Xt) and the history of past switches. Because multiple switches are possible, (Mt) is not
sufficient on its own for that purpose.
We denote strategy of player i by αi := {τ i(n) : n ≥ 1} where τ i are certain stopping
times. Admissibility of τ i(n) is defined recursively, based on the initial state (x,m). Let
(Ft)t≥0 be the natural filtration generated by (Xt). Set σ0 = 0, X0 = x, M˜0 = m. For n ≥ 1,
we require τ i(n) to be F˜ (n)-adapted and set
F˜ (n)t = Ft
∨
σ
{
(σk, Pk, M˜k), k < n
}
, (3a)
σn = τ
1(n) ∧ τ2(n), (3b)
Pn = 1 · 1{τ1(n)<τ2(n)} + 2 · 1{τ1(n)>τ2(n)} +Hn · 1{τ1(n)=τ2(n)}, (3c)
M˜n = M˜n−1 + 1 · 1{Pn=1} − 1 · 1{Pn=2}. (3d)
The meaning of n = 1, . . . , is the counter for the overall “round” of the switching game, with
σn recording the corresponding n-th switch time, Pn the identity of the player who makes
the n-th switch, and M˜n the macro market state after n total switches are exercised.
In (3c) we address scenarios that both players intend to switch at the same time by
letting Hn denote the identity of the resulting leader. As a simple example, Hn ≡ 1 if Player
1 has the instantaneous priority to switch. In general, resolving Hn requires consideration
of auxiliary discrete-stage game [16, 29] that happens instantaneously at τm on the event
{τ1(n) = τ2(n)}; the latter could involve mixed strategies, i.e. there is an additional random
variable ωt that determines the value of Hn. This is another reason why we must explicitly
augment the history of Pk to the history of (Xt) in (3a).
Definition 2.3. (Admissible Strategies) The set of admissible closed-loop strategies A is
α
i := {τ i(n) : n ≥ 1} where τ i(n) is adapted to (F˜ (n)t ) with σn, Pn, M˜n constructed in (3),
and satisfying
• bounded domain of (Mt): τ1(n) = +∞ if M˜n = m, τ2(n) = +∞ if M˜n = m;
• ordered in time: τ i(n) ≥ σn−1, i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀n ≥ 1;
• defined for all times: limn→∞ σn = +∞.
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Note that strategies in A are of Closed Loop Perfect State (CLPS) type, see a detailed
exposition in [8, Ch. 3]. The three admissibility conditions state that only one player can act
when (Mt) is at its minimum/maximum value and also rule out a clustering of switches in
finite time. The latter restriction limn→∞ σn = +∞ is mild, as it would be sub-optimal to
make infinite switches, as soon as there are some switching costs. Note that definition 2.3
is joint over the profile (α1,α2) and also depends on the initial condition. In the sequel we
suppress this dependence for lighter notation.
Let us revisit the construction (3) with (α1,α2) denoting these players’ strategies. Given
the strategy profile (α1,α2), the evolution of (Mt) is admitted as
Mt := M˜η(t), with η(t) = max{n ≥ 0 : σn ≤ t}. (4)
It is entirely possible and feasible that one player acts immediately, τ i(n) = σn−1, in which
case σn = σn−1, hence (Mt) formally undergoes multiple changes simultaneously. Further-
more, we describe the sequence of switching times realized by each player, denoted by σik,
i ∈ {1, 2}, k ≥ 1 as
σik := ση(i,k), with η(i, k) = min{n ≥ 1 :
n∑
l=1
1{Pl=i} = k}. (5)
2.2 Game Payoffs
The game payoffs J i’s received by these players are the total net present value (NPV) of future
profits, namely the discounted expected future cashflows, minus the discounted switching
costs.
Definition 2.4. (Game Payoffs) Given a strategy profile (α1,α2), the NPV of future profits
received by player i is
J im(x;α
1,α2) := E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtπi
(
Xt, M˜η(t)
)
dt−
∞∑
n=1
1{Pn=i}e
−rσn ·Ki(Xσn , M˜n−1)
∣∣∣∣∣X0 = x,M0 = m
]
,
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtπi
(
Xt,Mt
)
dt−
∑
k
e−rσ
i
kKi
(
Xσi
k
, M˜η(i,k)−1
) ∣∣∣∣∣X0 = x,M0 = m
]
(6)
where r > 0 is the constant discount rate.
Let us introduce the static discounted future cashflows
Dim(x) := E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtπi(Xt,m)dt
∣∣∣∣X0 = x] , (7)
which are assumed to satisfy the growth condition Dim(x) ≤ C(1 + |x|) for i ∈ {1, 2} and all
m ∈ M. Because switching costs are non-negative, game payoffs are also of linear growth
since they are dominated by Di’s, in particular J1m(x) ≤ D1m(x) while J2m(x) ≤ D2m(x).
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2.3 Nash Equilibrium: Fixed Points of Best-response
To describe players’ behavior in this nonzero-sum game we utilize Markov Nash equilibria
(MNE).
Definition 2.5. (Nash Equilibrium) Let J im(x, ·) denote the game payoff received by player i
with X0 = x,M0 = m. The strategy profile (α
1,∗, α2,∗) ∈ A is said to be a Nash equilibrium
of the switching game if for any x ∈ D,m ∈ M and strategy αi(x) of player i such that
(αi(x),αj,∗) is admissible
J im(x; α
i(x),αj,∗) ≤ J im(x; αi,∗,αj,∗). (8)
The corresponding V im(x) := J
i
m(x; α
i,∗,αj,∗) is then named the equilibrium payoff of player
i.
The Nash equilibrium criterion (8) characterizes equilibrium strategies as a fixed point
of each player’s best-response to her rival’s strategy. Specifically, given an arbitrary rival’s
strategy αj define the resulting best-response payoff of player i
V˜ im(x ;α
j) := sup
{αi:(αi,αj)∈A}
J im(x;α
i,αj), x ∈ D,m ∈ M. (9)
Because (taking Player 1 as an example) game payoffs satisfyD1m(x) ≥ V˜ 1m(x;α2) ≥ J1m(x; α¯1,α2) ≥
D1m(x), such best-response values are always well-defined. Equilibrium payoffs then satisfy:
V im(x) = V˜
i
m(x ;α
j,∗), i ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i. (10)
3 Constructing an Equilibrium
We now focus on a special class of strategies, which are stationary and of threshold-type, and
allow us to explicitly construct a MNE. To do so, two key properties are needed. First, one
must show that this class of strategies is closed under the best-response map (9). Second, a
verification theorem is needed to show that the resulting fixed point of (10), defined through a
system of equations, is indeed a MNE of the game. The programme starts in Section 3.1 where
we define threshold-type strategies and then characterize the best-response to such strategies
as a solution to a system of coupled optimal stopping problems. Next, in Section 3.3 we state
the verification theorem which provides a system of nonlinear equations for the equilibrium
threshold vectors s1,∗, s2,∗. Lastly in Section 3.4 we study the emerging equilibrium macro
state M∗.
3.1 Stationary and Threshold-type Strategies
The time-stationary Markovian strategies, also known as Feedback Perfect State (FPS) type
defined in [8, Ch. 3] depend only on the current Xt and M˜η(t). Following the idea of a similar
construction in [1], we define a strategy of player i ∈ {1, 2} by αi := (Γim)m∈M, where Γim’s
are fixed subsets of D. Given a strategy profile (α1,α2), a sequence of switches is uniquely
determined as follows:
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— when Mt = m, player i adopts the (feedback) switching region Γ
i
m: player i exercises
a switch (changes M it by ±1) at the first hitting time τ im of (Xt) to Γim (with the
convention that the hitting time of an empty set is ∞);
— if both players want to switch, Player 1 has the priority.
Admissibility of the strategy profile (α1,α2) in definition 2.3 now reduces to
— Γ1m = Γ
2
m = ∅ (Mt ∈ M)
— Γ1m ∩Γ2m+1 = ∅ for m < m and Γ1m−1 ∩Γ2m = ∅ for m > m. This rules out simultaneous
switching loops; for instance if there were an x ∈ Γ1m∩Γ2m+1 then starting in regime m,
we would have that P1 switches up to m+ 1, but them immediately P2 switches back
down to m, generating an infinite sequence of instantaneous switches.
Relying on the resulting Markov structure of threshold-type strategies, we revisit the
formal game evolution which can now be constructed using independent auxiliary copies
X˜(n), n = 1, . . . , of the strong Markov X. Below, Xx denotes the X-process started at
X0 = x. Let x ∈ D, m ∈ M, and a strategy profile (α1,α2) ∈ A. Set σ0 = 0, X0 = x and
M˜0 = m. For n ≥ 0, define
X˜
(n)
t = X
x
σn+t, for t ≥ 0, (11a)
τ˜ i,n = inf{s ≥ 0 : X˜(n)s ∈ ΓiM˜n}, i ∈ {1, 2}, (11b)
σn+1 = σn + τ˜
1,n ∧ τ˜2,n, (11c)
Pn+1 = 1 · 1{τ˜1,n<τ˜2,n} + 2 · 1{τ˜1,n>τ˜2,n} +Hn+11{τ˜1,n=τ˜2,n}, (11d)
M˜n+1 = M˜n + 1 · 1{Pn+1=1} − 1 · 1{Pn+1=2}. (11e)
Then the evolution of (Mt) and the sequence of switching times of each player (σ
i
k)k≥1 are
obtained as in (4) and (5). The strong Markov property of X implies that each X˜(n) can be
considered as a fresh (independent) copy of X starting at X˜
(n)
0 = X
x
σn . Consequently, given
these players’ strategies, the pair (Xt,Mt) is Markovian.
Recall that Player 1 is in favor of highXt and largeMt, while Player 2 prefers the opposite;
it is therefore natural to assume that P1 switches up when X becomes high enough and P2
switches down when X becomes low enough.
Definition 3.1. (Threshold-type Strategies) Let si := (sim)m∈M be a vector which character-
izes subsets of D for the switching regions Γim of player i ∈ {1, 2} according to
Γ1m ≡ Γ1m(s1) := [s1m, d), and Γ2m ≡ Γ2m(s2) := (d, s2m]. (12)
A strategy associated to (Γim)m∈M is called of threshold-type and denoted by s
i.
In fig. 1 we sketch the emerging equilibrium based on threshold-type strategies associated
to one of our case studies. The players make a switch whenever the process (Xt) hits the
threshold s1,∗m from below or s
2,∗
m from above when at stage m, see the dashed lines in the
bottom plot. The switching times σik are described through the respective hitting times. The
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top panel shows the resulting macro stage (M∗t ) driven by σ
i
k’s along one realized trajectory
of the local market fluctuations (Xt). These players are “at equal strength” in the beginning,
M∗0 = 0; as (Xt) drops, it enters Player 2’s switching region first (τ
2(1) < τ1(1)) leading her
to exercise a switch and change M∗
σ21
= −1. The players then recursively wait for (Xt) to hit
either the threshold s1,∗−1 or s
2,∗
−1 (τ
1(2) ∧ τ2(2)), to make further switches.
Note that in the above definition we require Γim to be connected, so that they are fully
characterized by their boundary sim. In turn, threshold-type strategies allow to move from
looking at the unstructured (in the sense of optimization) switching strategies defined by
general Γim to searching for equilibria parametrized by the |M|-vectors s1, s2. In particular,
this reduces the search for MNE to a 2|M|-dimensional setting where numerical resolution
becomes possible. Towards this goal, the main aim in this section is to constructively find
such threshold equilibria.
Remark 2. (Boundary Stages) Recall that admissible strategies defined in definition 2.3 imply
Player 1 (resp. Player 2) cannot make any switches at stage m (resp. at stage m). In terms
of threshold-type strategies this is equivalent to simply taking s1m = d and s
2
m = d which can
be viewed as a constraint on possible admissible controls.
Given a threshold-type strategy αj ≡ sj of player j, we expect the best-response strategy
of player i to be consistently of threshold-type (see corollary 3.5). The Dynamic Programming
Principle (DPP) implies that her corresponding value function, V˜ i(·; sj) defined in (9), solves
a system of coupled stopping problems (see [4]). Namely letting τm := τ
1
m ∧ τ2m (with τ jm
−2
−1
0
1
2
Sta
ge
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−4
−2
0
2
4
t
Sta
te
Figure 1: A trajectory of X and equilibrium M∗ starting at X0 = 0, M
∗
0 = 0. Here X
is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and M = {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2}. The equilibrium strategies
are of threshold-type; the dashed lines in the bottom plot indicate the respective switching
thresholds sim. Thus, the switching times σn are hitting times of the above.
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pre-specified hitting times according to sj), we expect that
V˜ im(x ; s
j) = sup
τ im∈T
Ex
[∫ τm
0
e−rtπim(Xt)dt+ e
−rτm1{τ1m>τ
2
m}
(
V˜ im−1(Xτ2m ; s
j)− 1{i=2}Kim(Xτ2m)
)
+ e−rτm1{τ1m<τ2m}
(
V˜ im+1(Xτ1m ; s
j)− 1{i=1}Kim(Xτ1m)
)
+ e−rτm1{τ1m=τ2m}
(
V˜ im+1(Xτ im ; s
j)− 1{i=1}Kim(Xτ im)
)]
, (13)
for i ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i, ∀x ∈ D and all m ∈ M. Above T denotes all F-stopping times, but the
optimizer τ˜ im is expected to be associated to a threshold s˜
i
m. We use the shorthand notation
Ex [·] := E [·|X0 = x], and the subscript in V˜ im to indicate the conditioning on M0 = m.
Intuitively, at regime m player i implements a timing strategy to exercise her control at τ im,
and a realization of these two stopping times yields a “leader”, who acts first and switches
Mτm . Note that in the case {τ1 = τ2} Player 1 has the priority to switch.
To approach the coupled system (13) we first consider the corresponding generic local
constrained optimal stopping problem (which uncouples (13) by removing V˜ im−1, V˜
i
m+1 from
the right-hand-side) and then the game equilibrium that is characterized as the best response
to sj,∗. See [4] for a related analysis of unconstrained optimal switching problems.
3.2 Building Block
To find the best-response of player i, we consider a local optimal stopping problem of the
form
v˜i(x; τ j) = sup
τ i∈T
Ex
[
1{τ i<τ j}e
−rτ ihi(Xτ i) + 1{τ i>τ j}e
−rτ j li(Xτ j ) + 1{τ i=τ j}e
−rτ igi(Xτ i)
]
,
(14)
where τ j is a given stopping time, hi(·) is the leader payoff from switching before τ j , and
li(·) is the follower payoff from switching after τ j . gi(·) denotes the payoff of player i when
both players want to switch simultaneously. In our setting, g1 = h1, while g2 = l2 due to the
priority of Player 1.
In order to obtain threshold-type equilibrium, one would expect the optimizer to (14), τ˜ i
to be of threshold-type, given τ j is of threshold-type. However, as discussed at length in [2]
this is not always true. If player j behaves aggressively, player i would try to preempt right
before, leading to lack of optimal τ i.
Assumption 3.2. (i) The exogenous stopping time τ j is of threshold-type,
τ j := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ Γj}, j ∈ {1, 2}, with Γ1 := [s1, d) and Γ2 := (d, s2].
(ii) There are two function classes Hinc and Hdec defined in appendix A such that h1 ∈ Hinc
and h2 ∈ Hdec.
(iii) player i is not incentivized to preempt at sj, i.e. hi(sj) < li(sj).
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Under the above assumptions, it is known that the solution of (14) is of threshold-type.
Specifically, this can be established using the smallest concave majorant method, see e.g. [2,
14, 15]. Let us remark that assumption 3.2 (iii) is essential for this result and would be hard
to check in the sequel. Nevertheless, if the rest of assumption 3.2 is fulfilled, there exists
uniquely a preemptive best-response, see [2].
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that all conditions of assumption 3.2 are satisfied. Let F,G be
the solutions to (L − r)u = 0, where L is the infinitesimal generator of X. Set
W (x1, x2) := F
′(x1)G(x2)− F (x1)G′(x2) (15)
W(x1, x2) := F (x1)G(x2)− F (x2)G(x1). (16)
Then the value function of (14) is admitted as
v˜i(x; τ j) =

hi(x), for x ∈ Γi,
li(x), for x ∈ Γj,
ω˜iF (x) + ν˜iG(x), for x ∈ D \ (Γi ∪ Γj) ,
where the optimal stopping region Γi = Γ(s˜i) is of threshold-type and defined uniquely through
the threshold s˜i := s˜i(sj) (with s˜1 > s2 and s˜2 < s1) that satisfies
hi(s˜i)W (s˜i, sj)− li(sj)W (s˜i, s˜i)− (hi)′(s˜i)W(s˜i, sj) = 0. (17)
The coefficients ω˜i := ω˜i(s˜i, sj) and ν˜i := ν˜i(s˜i, sj) are defined as
ω˜i =
hi(s˜i)G(sj)− li(sj)G(s˜i)
W(s˜i, sj) , ν˜
i =
li(sj)F (s˜i)− hi(s˜i)F (sj)
W(s˜i, sj) . (18)
Remark 3. The above proposition subsumes the case where only one player is able to act.
In this situation we may simply take s1 = d or s2 = d, and player i then effectively solves a
standard optimal stopping problem as a special case of (14). See related discussion in [2, Sec
4.1]. These cases arise in the boundary stages m,m associated to (13).
3.3 Best-Response Verification Theorem
By construction of MNEs in definition 2.5, game payoffs and threshold-type strategies as-
sociated to an equilibrium necessarily solve the local optimizing problems stated in (13).
Moreover, they necessarily are fixed-points to the following pair of optimizing problems at
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each regime m:
V 1m(x) = sup
τ1m∈T
Ex
[∫ τm
0
e−rtπ1m(Xt)dt+ e
−rτm1{τ1m>τ
2,∗
m }
(
V 1m−1(Xτ2,∗m )
)
+e−rτm1{τ1m≤τ
2,∗
m }
(
V 1m+1(Xτ1m)−K1m(Xτ1m)
)]
,
V 2m(x) = sup
τ2m∈T
Ex
[∫ τm
0
e−rtπ2m(Xt)dt+ e
−rτm1
{τ1,∗m >τ2m}
(
V 2m−1(Xτ2m)−K2m(Xτ2m)
)
+e−rτm1
{τ1,∗m ≤τ2m}
(
V 2m+1(Xτ1,∗m )
)]
,
(19)
where τ1,∗m , τ
2,∗
m are the stopping times associated to the thresholds s
1,∗
m , s
2,∗
m . Comparing to
the generic problem in (14) and subtracting Dim(x) = Ex
[∫∞
0 e
−rtπim(Xs)dt
]
, we then wish
to set{
h1m(x) := V
1
m+1(x)−D1m(x)−K1m(x),
l1m(x) := V
1
m−1(x)−D1m(x),
{
h2m(x) := V
2
m−1(x)−D2m(x)−K2m(x),
l2m(x) := V
2
m+1(x)−D2m(x).
(20)
Plugging above into (17) and (18) for all m and combining, we obtain a coupled nonlinear
system in sim, ω
i
m, ν
i
m, whose solutions are expected to be a MNE of the switching game. We
now propose a verification theorem which confirms that this is indeed the case. Our proof
in appendix B follows the methods in [1] who considered nonzero-sum games with impulse
controls.
Theorem 3.4 (Verification Theorem). Let Γ1,∗m := [s
1,∗
m , d),Γ
2,∗
m := (d, s
2,∗
m ], s
1,∗
m > s
2,∗
m and
ω1m ≥ 0, ω2m ≤ 0, ν1m ≤ 0, ν2m ≥ 0. Define
V 1m(x) =

V 1m+1(x)−K1m(x), for x ∈ Γ1,∗m ,
V 1m−1(x), for x ∈ Γ2,∗m ,
D1m(x) + ω
1
mF (x) + ν
1
mG(x), for x ∈ D \
(
Γ1,∗m ∪ Γ2,∗m
)
,
(21a)
V 2m(x) =

V 2m+1(x), for x ∈ Γ1,∗m ,
V 2m−1(x)−K2m(x), for x ∈ Γ2,∗m ,
D2m(x) + ω
2
mF (x) + ν
2
mG(x), for x ∈ D \
(
Γ1,∗m ∪ Γ2,∗m
)
.
(21b)
Assume that (cf. assumption 3.2)
– D1m+1 −D1m −K1m ∈ Hinc for m < m, and D2m−1 −D2m −K2m ∈ Hdec for m > m;
– V 1m−1(s
2,∗) ≥ V 1m+1(s2,∗m ) − K1m(s2,∗m ), for m > m, and V 2m+1(s1,∗) ≥ V 2m−1(s1,∗m ) −
K2m(s
1,∗
m ), for m < m;
– thresholds si,∗m and coefficients ωim, ν
i
m, i ∈ {1, 2}, m ∈ M satisfy a system of non-linear
equation stated in (44) - (45).
12
Then,
(
s
1,∗, s2,∗
)
:=
(
Γ1,∗m , Γ
2,∗
m
)
m∈M
is a Markov Nash Equilibrium, and V i’s in (21) are
the corresponding equilibrium payoffs.
We slightly abuse the notation in (21) as V 1m+1 and V
2
m+1 do not exist. However, since in
fact s1,∗m = d and s
2,∗
m = d, so that Γ
1,∗
m = Γ
2,∗
m = ∅, the respective equations in (44) - (45) are
indeed well-defined.
The proof of theorem 3.4 can be repeated to obtain an analogous verification theorem
for the system of equations corresponding to the best-response value function V˜ im(x ; s
j) as
defined in (13) for any threshold-type rival strategy sj :
Corollary 3.5. Let s2 be the fixed switching thresholds of P2 and V˜ 1· (·; s2) be constructed as
in (21a). Suppose that
— D1m+1 −D1m −K1m ∈ Hinc for m < m;
— V˜ 1m−1(s
2
m; s
2) ≥ V˜ 1m+1(s2m; s2)−K1m(s2m), for m > m;
— (s˜1, s2, ω˜1, ν˜1) is a solution to (44a) & (45a).
Then s˜1 ≡ s˜1(s2) are the best-response thresholds, and V˜ 1m(x) are the corresponding best-
response value function of P1.
theorem 3.4 provides a direct approach to find a MNE of the switching game via solving
the system of equations for the threshold vectors si and equilibrium payoffs defined through ωi
and νi. Unfortunately, because this is a large system of equations (namely there are 6|M−1|
equations in total), the latter is non-trivial even numerically. In particular, most standard
root-finding algorithms require a reasonable initial guess. In our experience, providing such
a guess is not easy, so that the high-dimensional optimization algorithm frequently does not
converge. Thus, in Section 4 we propose two approaches to obtain threshold vectors and
game payoffs close to those in equilibrium.
Remark 4. In a more general setting, players are allowed to act onMt in multiple ways. Thus,
to each regimem there is an associated action set Cim ⊆M that determines the potential new
regimes that player i can switchM into. This generalizes the presentation above where C1m =
{m + 1} and C2m = {m − 1} are singletons. Analogously, one may consider other transition
diagrams (e.g. Player 1 acts by directly “resetting” to baseline regime m, C1m = {m} for all
m). When Cim has multiple elements, the corresponding player must choose how to switch, not
just when. In the latter case we need to specify the respective switching costs, i.e. to consider
Ki(m,m′) which defines the cost of switching fromm tom′. Such an extension can be handled
by replacing the leader payoff in (20) with h1m(x) = maxm′∈C1m [V
1
m′(x)−D1m(x)−K1(x,m,m′)]
and the follower payoff with ℓ1m(x) = V
1
m′(x) − D1m(x), where m′ = argmax{m′′ ∈ C2m :
V 2m′(s
2
m)−D2m −K2(s2m,m,m′)}. The above max-terms resemble the intervention operators
in impulse control.
3.4 Equilibrium Macro Dynamics
The macro market evolution M∗ emerging in equilibrium is a time inhomogeneous non-
Markovian process with discrete state space M. Thanks to the stationary nature of the
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threshold-type strategies, the behavior of M∗ is highly tractable and is the subject of this
subsection.
Recall that in (11e) we define the sequence of regimes M∗ traverses, i.e. M˜∗n ≡ M∗σn .
According to (11e), M˜∗n has memory: the next transition of M˜
∗
n is affected by the last
transition. For example, if M˜∗n = +1 and the previous regime was M˜
∗
n−1 = +2, this implies
that the latest switch was due to Player 2, and hence we begin the sojourn in regime +1 at
location s2,∗+2, i.e. X˜
(n)
0 = X
x
σn = s
2,∗
+2, while if the previous state was M˜
∗
n−1 = 0 then it was
Player 1 who switched last and we begin the sojourn at s1,∗0 , i.e. X˜
(n)
0 = X
x
σn = s
1,∗
0 .
To capture this 1-step memory we define the extended state space
E := {m−, (m+ 1)−, (m+ 1)+, · · · ,m−,m+, · · · , (m− 1)−, (m− 1)+,m+} ∪ {ma, ma},
(22)
where the superscript “+” corresponds to the previous transition being made by Player 1
(“up move in M”) and “−” corresponds to Player 2 making a “down move inM”. We discuss
the last two states ma, ma below.
Instead of M∗t we now define its extended jump chain Mˇn that takes values in E and
represents (M˜∗n−1, M˜
∗
n). Note that Mˇ0 is undefined, as we need to know the previous transition
to know the state of Mˇ . Let us use fig. 1 to explain how Mˇ behaves. The macro market
starts at X0 = 0 and M
∗
0 = 0, while Mˇ
∗ starts when (Xt) hits s
2,∗
0 with Mˇ
∗
1 = (−1)−. The
first sojourn begins at s2,∗0 and ends when (Xt) hits s
2,∗
−1, leading us to Mˇ
∗
2 = (−2)−, and so
forth.
We proceed to compute the qualitative behavior of M∗ via Mˇn. In the case that X is re-
current, the nature of threshold strategies implies thatM∗ will also have recurrent dynamics.
To quantify the dynamic macro equilibrium we then compute the long-run distribution of
M∗ on M. The latter is summarized via the transition probabilities of Mˇ∗n and the sojourn
times ξm of Mˇ
∗
n.
In the case when X is transient, M∗ should be transient too. Specifically, we should
encounter the situation that τ˜1,n∧ τ˜2,n = +∞ (see (11c)), so that no more switches take place
and M∗ remains constant forever or “absorbed”. Under the assumption that X is continuous
and regular, this phenomenon can only occur at the boundary states ofM, whereby one player
is a priori restricted from switching. This yields a one-sided switching region and hence the
possibility of a scenario that M∗t ≡ m (or m), for all t conditional on M∗0 = m, i.e. that X
never hits s2m starting at s
1
m−1 (or s
1
m starting at s
2
m+1). Note that given Xt = x,M
∗
t = m
(recall that the pair (Xt,M
∗
t ) is Markovian) one can not determine whether M
∗ is absorbed
or not. This is handled via taboo probabilities [12, Ch. Taboo Probabilities] which are taken
into account by adding the two “absorbing” states {ma, ma} to E. Probabilistically, when
switching up from (m − 1)±, potential absorption can be captured by nature tossing a coin
to decide whether the new state of Mˇ is m+ or ma.
Returning to the case of recurrent X, let ~Π denote the invariant distribution of Mˇ∗, solved
from ~ΠP = ~Π, where P is the transition probability matrix of Mˇ∗. Furthermore, let ~ξ be
the vector of expected sojourn times at each state of Mˇ , defined as
ξm− := E
[
τ˜1,n ∧ τ˜2,n | Mˇ∗n = m−
]
, ξm+ := E
[
τ˜1,n ∧ τ˜2,n | Mˇ∗n = m+
]
, (23)
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where the threshold hitting times τ˜ i,n are defined in (11b). It follows that the long-run
proportion of time that M∗ spends at regime m (recall that M∗t = m is captured by Mˇ
∗
η(t) =
m±) is given by:
ρm =
Πm+ξm+ +Πm−ξm−∑
j∈M{Πj+ξj+ +Πj−ξj−}
, for all m ∈ M. (24)
Now let us considerX to be non-recurrent so that one or both of the boundary regimes are
absorbing, w.l.o.g m+ for example. In the long-run we then trivially have limt→∞M
∗
t = m
and the quantities of interest in this situation are the expected number of controls exercised
by player i before M∗ gets absorbed, i.e.
N
i
m(x) := lim
T→∞
Ex
[∑
k
1{σi
k
≤T}
∣∣M∗0 = m], i ∈ {1, 2}, (25)
and the expected time until absorption,
Tm(x) := Ex
[
min
{
t ≥ 0 : Mˇ∗η(t) ∈ {ma,ma}
} ∣∣M∗0 = m]. (26)
Analytic evaluation of these quantities is given in appendix D which also provides expressions
for the transition matrix P of Mˇ∗ and sojourn times ~ξ. Computations specific to the OU
example 2.1 and the GBM example 2.2 processes are also discussed.
3.5 Stackelberg Switching
We emphasize that the order of switches is never pre-determined and so the identity of the
n-th switcher, Pn, is resolved endogenously based on game evolution and the realization of
(Xt). A variant of the switching game would be to pre-specify the identity of the player
making the next switch, but not its timing, akin to a Stackelberg equilibrium where the
leader and follower roles are fixed but timing strategy remains. The latter situation also
arises organically if we restrict Mt ∈ {−1,+1} which implies that players will alternate in
their actions: ... ≤ σ1k ≤ σ2k ≤ σ1k+1 ≤ σ2k+1 ≤ ... Indeed, at any given stage only one firm can
control (Mt) so no consideration of simultaneous competition is needed (See [6]).
It is instructive to consider a stationary threshold-type equilibrium in this setting, which
reduces to characterizing the two thresholds s1,∗−1 and s
2,∗
+1. Furthermore, if their profit rates
and switching costs depend on the local market environment (Xt) symmetrically around 0 and
(Xt) is a process symmetric around 0 (like the OU process), we may search for a symmetric
equilibrium with s1,∗−1 = −s2,∗+1 =: sˇ and V 1. (x) = V 2. (−x) for any x ∈ D. In turn this reduces
finding the MNE to solving a single nonlinear equation in sˇ, providing some insight into the
respective structure.
Examining theorem 3.4 for Player 1, the system of equations is simplified to
V 1−1(x) =
{
V 1+1(x)−K1−1(x), x ≥ sˇ,
D1−1(x) + ω
1
−1F (x), x < sˇ,
V 1+1(x) =
{
D1+1(x) + ν
1
+1G(x), x > −sˇ,
V 1−1(x), x ≤ −sˇ,
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where sˇ, ω1−1, ν
1
+1 satisfy the following system (compare to (45))(
V 1+1 −D1−1 −K1−1
)
(sˇ) · F ′(sˇ)− (V 1+1 −D1−1 −K1−1)′(sˇ) · F (sˇ) = 0, (27a)(
V 1+1 −D1−1 −K1−1
)
(sˇ)− ω1−1F (sˇ) = 0, (27b)(
V 1−1 −D1+1
)
(−sˇ)− ν1+1G(−sˇ) = 0. (27c)
Note that the last two equations specify ω1−1, ν
1
+1 in terms of V
1
±1(±sˇ). One can now show
that this system admits at least one solution.
Corollary 3.6. Suppose that profit rates and switching costs are continuous and depend
on the local market environment (Xt) symmetrically about 0, and (Xt) is a process sym-
metric around 0. Then there exists a threshold-type MNE for the switching game with
M = {−1,+1}.
Proof. See appendix E.
4 Sequential Approach to MNEs
To approximate the system of nonlinear equations (44) - (45) proposed in theorem 3.4 we pro-
vide two sequential approaches. The first approach is through best-response iterations among
threshold-type strategies, while the other inducts on equilibrium in finite-switch strategies.
The resulting threshold vectors si can be used as initial guesses in a root-finding algorithm.
4.1 Constructing MNE by Best-response Iteration
Given the rival’s strategy, determining the best-response of one player is similar to a single-
agent optimal switching problem, which has been studied in [4, 10]. Let us assume that Player
2 implements a threshold-type strategy s2 as in definition 3.1. The best-response of Player
1 is then expected to be characterized through (13), which is a system of coupled optimal
stopping problems.
We then decouple this system, in particular to apply proposition 3.3 that provides the
best-response threshold and game payoff of Player 1 once the leader/follower payoffs are fully
specified. To do so, we consider auxiliary problems where the number of actions/switches
available to Player 1 is bounded. Namely, Player 1 is constrained to ever use at most N1(≥ 1)
controls. Her corresponding set of strategies is defined as
A1,(N1) := {(α1, s2) ∈ A : τ1(n) = +∞, n > η(1, N1)} , (28)
where τ1(n) is the stopping rule Player 1 adopts at the n-th “round” of the game and η(1, N1)
defined in (5) denotes the round at which Player 1 exercises her N1-th switch. Note that now
the stopping sets are allowed to explicitly depend on the remaining number of controls left
(equivalent to number of switches already used plus an initial constraint). The best-response
of Player 1 with N1 controls is then admitted as
V˜ 1,(N
1)
m (x ; s
2) := sup
α1,(N
1)∈A1,(N
1)
J1m(x;α
1,(N1), s2), ∀x ∈ D, (29)
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for all m ∈ M. When Player 1 has zero controls N1 = 0, her payoff at any stage m is fully
determined by s2, for instance at regime m+ 1
V˜
1,(0)
m+1 (x ; s
2) = Ex
[∫ τ2m+1
0
e−rtπ1m+1 (Xt) dt
]
+ Ex
[
e−rτ
2
m+1
]
·D1m(s2m+1), (30)
where the last term is the NPV of fixed-market-state cashflows defined in (7).
Proposition 4.1. Given a threshold-type strategy sj of player j, the best-response game
payoffs of player i with finite controls converge as N i →∞, i.e. ∀x ∈ D,
V˜ i,(N
i)
m (x ; s
j)ր V˜ im(x ; sj), for all m ∈ M as N i ր∞.
Proof of proposition 4.1 is inspired by [4] and stated in appendix C. Moreover, strong
Markov property of X and Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) imply that
V˜ 1,(N
1)
m (x ; s
2) = sup
τ1(1)∈T
Ex
[∫ τm
0
e−rtπ1m(Xt)dt+ e
−rτm1{τ1(1)>τ2m}
· V˜ 1,(N1)m−1 (Xτ2m ; s2)
+ e−rτm1{τ1(1)≤τ2m}
(
V˜
1,(N1−1)
m+1 (Xτ1(1) ; s
2)−K1m(Xτ1(1))
)]
,
(31)
for all m ∈ M, ∀x ∈ D, with τ2m the first hitting time of Γ2m = (d, s2m], and dependence
of τ1(1) on N1 omitted for brevity. We refer to [4, 10] who proved that DPP holds in this
problem and [2] who analyzed finite-control stopping games.
Notice that game payoffs (30) can be treated as starting points to implement a back-
ward Dynamic Programming scheme to solve the finite-control optimal stopping problem
introduced in (31). Suppose that V˜
1,(N1)
m−1 (· ; sj) and V˜ 1,(N
1−1)
m+1 (· ; sj) are determined, and
assumption 3.2 holds. We denote
v˜1,N
1
(x ; τ2m) := V˜
1,(N1)
m (x ; s
j)−D1m(x),
h1,N
1
(x) := V˜
1,(N1−1)
m+1 (x ; s
j)−D1m(x)−K1m(x),
l1,N
1
(x) := V˜
1,(N1)
m−1 (x ; s
j)−D1m(x)
and apply proposition 3.3 with leader/follower payoffs h1,N
1
, l1,N
1
to obtain best-response
game payoff V˜
1,(N1)
m (x ; s2), which is parameterized by ω˜
1,(N1)
m ,ν˜
1,(N1)
m , s˜
1,(N1)
m . Thanks to
proposition 4.1 we know V˜
1,(N1)
m (x ; s2) converges, thus expect s˜
1,(N1)
m → s˜1m would converge
as well as N1 → ∞. Thus, for N1 large, we may use s˜1,(N1) to define a time-stationary
strategy that is a proxy for the best response.
Building upon the preceding convergence result, we propose the following algorithm to
determine a threshold-type Markov Nash equilibrium. Essentially, we apply the taˆtonnement
approach, alternating in finding the best-response strategies of the two players, expecting
to converge to an associated best-response fixed point. These alternating best-responses are
indexed by “rounds” a = 1, 2, . . . , A. At odd rounds, Player 1 solves for her best response
(i = 1, j = 2); at even rounds, Player 2 solves for her best response (i = 2, j = 1):
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①: Set the strategy of player j to be of threshold-type as sj,a:
– For a = 1, set s2,1 as the monopoly thresholds of P2, i.e. when P1 is not allowed
to switch (N1 = 0 case). The thresholds s2,1 can then be obtained by solving a
single-agent optimal switching problem.
– For a > 1 set sj,a = s˜j,a−1.
②: Solve for s˜i,a and value function V˜
i,(N)
m (· ; sj,a) for all m ∈ M:
– Solve optimal stopping problems when player i is allowed at most n switches and
player j applies sj,a using proposition 3.3, iteratively for n = 1, . . . , N .
– Record V˜
i,(N)
m (·) and the approximate best-response strategy s˜i,a(sj,a−1) ≃ s˜i,(N)
③: Change the roles of i and j (alternate which player is solving for the best response)
④: Repeat steps ① - ③ as a = 1, . . . , until the maximum change in |s˜i,(N),a − s˜i,(N),a−2|,
i ∈ {1, 2} are both less than a predetermined tolerance level Tol (or simply for A
rounds).
fig. 2 illustrates the above best-response induction in one of our case-studies. In each
round we iterate to find the best response assuming player i has up to N i switches. During
the odd rounds a = 1, 3, . . . Player 2 implements the stationary strategy s2,a and her game
values (gray ‘+’) decrease as the number of Player 1’s controls N1 = 1, . . . , 30 increases.
In contrast, during the even iterations, Player 2 game values V˜
2,(N2)
m converge upwards as
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Figure 2: Finding fixed point of best-response maps via the tatonnement process over a
with M = {−1, 0,+1}. Squares represent rounds a = 1, 3, . . . where player’s 2 strategy is
fixed. Triangles represent even rounds a = 2, 4, . . . where player’s 1 strategy is fixed. (Left):
Game values of Player 2 with M0 = 0 and X0 = 0 indexed according to V˜
2,N2(x; s1,a) with
N2 = 1, 2, . . . , 30. (Right): Thresholds s
i,a
0 as a function of a at m = 0 and N = 30. The
enlarged square represents the first round a = 1 and the enlarged triangle represents the last
a = 30 round which appears to be close to a fixed point.
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N2 = 1, . . . , 30. The corresponding thresholds si,am are shown on the right panel. We observe
that both game values and thresholds converge after 30 inner iterations over N i, and over
A = 30 outer tatonnement rounds (a total of 30×30×2 optimal stopping problems solved via
proposition 3.3). In particular, we may take s
i,(N),A
m as an approximation of a best response
fixed-point and hence of the equilibrium si,∗m .
4.2 Constructing MNEs by Equilibrium Induction
Another approach to construct an (approximate) threshold-type MNE of the switching game
is to take limits in a finite-control game of timing. This links to the earlier work by the authors
in [2]. Suppose that both players are constrained to finite control strategies with respective
bounds n1, n2 on total allowed number of switches. Specifically we consider strategies of the
form
α
i,(n1,n2) :=
(
Γi,(k
1,k2)
m
)k1≤n1,k2≤n2
m∈M
, with Γi,(0,k
j)
m ≡ ∅, (32)
where ki ≤ ni denotes the number of controls remaining for player i, and index stages of this
game as
(Mt, N
1
t , N
2
t ) := {macro market regime, # controls remaining for P1, # controls remaining for P2},
with Mt ∈ M, and N it is a non-increasing piecewise-constant process on N with N i0 = ki for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Duopoly games of this type are studied by [2], who determine local equilibria at
each game stage by backward dynamic programming and patch them to construct a global
one.
At sub-stage (m,k1, k2), the local equilibrium is characterized as a fixed point of these
players’ best-response based on proposition 3.3. Taking Player 1 as an example again, her
leader and follower payoffs are related to her equilibrium game payoffs at adjacent stages
which are known when implementing backward dynamic programming:{
h
1,(k1,k2)
m (x) := V
1,(k1−1,k2)
m+1 (x)−D1m(x)−K1m(x),
l
1,(k1,k2)
m (x) := V
1,(k1,k2−1)
m−1 (x)−D1m(x),
(33)
and their equilibrium strategies (τ
1,(k1,k2),∗
m , τ
2,(k1,k2),∗
m ) and game payoffs solve a pair of opti-
mal stopping problems:
V
1,(k1,k2)
m (x)−D1m(x) = sup
τ
1,(k1,k2)
m ∈T
Ex
[
1
{τ
1,(k1,k2)
m <τ
2,(k1,k2),∗
m }
· h1,(k1,k2)m (Xτ1,(k1,k2)m )
+1
{τ
1,(k1,k2)
m >τ
2,(k1,k2),∗
m }
· l1,(k1,k2)m (X
τ
2,(k1,k2),∗
m
)
]
,
V
2,(k1,k2)
m (x)−D2m(x) = sup
τ
2,(k1,k2)
m ∈T
Ex
[
1
{τ
1,(k1,k2),∗
m <τ
2,(k1,k2)
m }
· l2,(k1,k2)m (Xτ1,(k1,k2),∗m )
+1
{τ
1,(k1,k2),∗
m >τ
2,(k1,k2)
m }
· h2,(k1,k2)m (X
τ
2,(k1,k2)
m
)
]
.
(34)
19
Figure 3: A schematic diagram illustrating induction on local timing equilibria of Section 4.2,
starting at (−1, 0, 0) and with m = −2 and m = +2, which leads to ∆−2 = −1,∆−1 =
0, . . . ,∆+2 = 3 in (35). The diagram illustrates the reachable stages (m,k
1, k2) relative
to (M0, 0, 0) and using the “forward” dynamic programming scheme. Blue circles denote
single-agent optimization sub-stages that correspond to optimal stopping problems, while
red circles denote interior stages where local timing equilibrium is determined according to
(34). Boundary stages are those where k1 = 0 or k2 = 0 or m ∈ {m,m}. Stages not reachable
from (−1, 0, 0) are omitted.
Note that simultaneous switches can be ruled out since on the event {τ i,(k1,k2)m = τ j,(k
1,k2),∗
m },
stopping by Player 1 is strictly dominated by the strategy of first waiting, and then optimally
switching as follower. In [2] we show that the local equilibrium exists under some regularity
conditions on Di’s and Ki’s, however uniqueness cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, such a
local equilibrium is not always of threshold-type, as preemptive equilibria may emerge.
In the example sketched in Figures 3-4(b), we implement a forward scheme to generate
a sequence of equilibria starting at sub-stage (m,k1, k2) = (−1, 0, 0) where the payoffs are
V
i,(0,0)
−1 (x) = D
i
−1(x). With this known, we can solve for the local equilibria at stages (0, 0, 1)
and (−2, 1, 0) utilizing (33). Iterating, we find local equilibria for all triplets (m,k1, k2) shown
in the Figure (Throughout, we make the ansatz that local equilibria are all of threshold-type
at any sub-stage (m,k1, k2)). These triplets can be characterized as k2 = k1 + ∆m, where
the auxiliary parameter ∆m is the difference between the number of switches available to the
players at regime m. For instance ∆−1 = 0 in fig. 3, so that the players are equally endowed
whenever they are at regime Mt = −1, cf. the sub-stages (−1, 1, 1), (−1, 2, 2), . . . . The sub-
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stages (m,k1, k2) that are not reachable from (−1, 0, 0) are omitted and in this instance we
need not consider the respective local equilibria.
Using the terminal game stage (−1, 0, 0) and continuing up to k1 ≤ N , the above forward
scheme iteratively yields a sequence of equilibrium thresholds s
i,(n,n+∆m)
m and game coefficients
(ω
i,(n,n+∆m)
m , νi,(n,n+∆m)). The resulting game payoffs are shown in fig. 4(a). As mentioned,
the parameter ∆m influences all the equilibria in fig. 3. For example, in the presented scheme,
the game will eventually end with Mt = −1 for t large enough. Nevertheless, as N increases,
we expect that this effect vanishes, so that the limits are independent of ∆m:s
i,(n,n+∆m)
m
ω
i,(n,n+∆m)
m
νi,(n,n+∆m)
 as nր∞−−−−−−→
s
i,∗
m
ωi,∗m
νi,∗m
 , i ∈ {1, 2},m ∈ M. (35)
This convergence can be observed in fig. 4 where the underlying symmetries imply V
1,(n,n+1)
0 (0) =
V
2,(n+1,n)
0 (0). Thus, we may interpret the top curve in fig. 4(a) as the game payoff in the
finite-stage setup when the player has one more switch than her rival, and the bottom curve
as her game payoff when she has one fewer switch relative to the rival. As n → ∞, the
relative benefit vanishes and both V
i,(n,n±1)
0 (x) approach V
i
0 (x). Similarly, in fig. 4(b) the
finite-horizon distribution of M∗,(n,n+1) converges to that of M∗ on [0, T¯ ), T¯ = 50.
Two issues arise with the above scheme. First, the associated equilibrium payoffs V i,(N
1
0 ,N
2
0 )
are not monotone in terms of N10 or N
2
0 . For instance, higher N
1
0 benefits P1, while higher
N20 harms her since her rival now has more flexibility. Changing both N
i’s simultaneously
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
25
30
35
40
45
50
Controls of Player 1
Eq
ui
lib
riu
m
 P
ay
o
ffs
Player 1
Player 2
(a) Finite-Control Equilibrium Payoffs
V
i,(n,n+1)
0 (X0)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Controls of Player 1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 T
im
e
+1
0
−1
(b) Finite-Control Distribution of M∗
Figure 4: Equilibrium induction using the forward scheme in fig. 3. We postulate that Player
2 has one extra control, N20 = N
1
0 + 1⇔ ∆0 = −1. Left : Equilibrium payoffs V i,(N
1
0 ,N
2
0 )
M0
(X0)
with X0 = 0, M0 = 0 indexed by N
1
0 . The dashed line denotes the limiting payoff V
i
0 (X0)
in the original infinite-control game. Right: time-averaged distribution of M
∗,(N10 ,N
2
0 )
t on
[0, T¯ ), T¯ = 50. Specifically, we show the values of ρm(T¯ ) := E
[
1
T¯
∫ T¯
0 1{M∗s=m}
ds
∣∣M∗0 = 0]
for m ∈ {−1, 0, 1} as N10 increases.
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leads to ambiguous results: in fig. 4(a) P1’s payoff decreases first, then increases in terms
of N10 = N
2
0 − 1. Thus convergence in (35) is hard to prove. Second, the local timing
game might generate multiple threshold-type equilibria [2]. As a result, equilibrium selection
becomes important when inducting on N i0’s.
Remark 5. Setting ∆m = m (resp. ∆m = m) is equivalent to granting P2 (resp. P1) infinite
number of allowed switches, while her rival is restricted to finite number of controls. This of
course confers an ultimate advantage to the privileged player who will ultimately “win out”
the competition. For example, taking (M0, N
1
0 , N
2
0 ) = (0, 4, 2) in the running example means
that P2 only has 2 switches, while P1 has four, so she will ultimately succeed in driving
to the best possible regime limt→∞Mt = +2 and will never require more than 4 switches
anyway (recall that m = +2). Thus this setting resembles the auxiliary game discussed in
Section 4.1, except that both players are now dynamically optimizing their thresholds.
5 Case Study: Mean-reverting Market Advantage
Continuing example 2.1, we describe the local market fluctuation (Xt) by an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (OU) process mean-reverting to θ = 0:
dXt = −µXtdt+ σdWt, (36)
with µ = 0.15, σ = 1.5, D = R (i.e. natural boundaries d = −∞ and d = +∞). This implies
that the stationary distribution of X is Gaussian, N (0, 7.5). For the discounting rate we take
r = 10%. The profit rates πim are constant and listed in table 1. Note that π
i’s are monotone
but concave in terms of the regime m. A motivating economic context is the advertising
competition between two firms. They can make an advertising campaign by paying Ki, with
the cost dependent on the exchange rate (Xt). The effect of advertising (i.e. exercising a
change in M) is to enhance one firm’s dominance in the market, bringing her higher profit
rates. Due to diminishing returns to scale, improvement in the profit rate decreases as the
firm captures more and more market share, so that πim is concave in m.
In table 1 our intent is that the profit ladder extends to the right and to the left forever,
however the above concavity makes it uneconomical to reach extreme levels of dominance.
Thus, we progressively enlarge the number of market regimes considered: Mt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
(Case I), Mt ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} (Case II), and Mt ∈ {−3, . . . , 3} (Case III). Below we also
consider an asymmetric situation with Mt ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}.
The switching costs Ki’s are affected by Xt:
Kim(x) := ci · (1 + e(−1)
iβix), i ∈ {1, 2}, (37)
where ci = 0.5, βi = 0.5, i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, Player 1 can make cheap switches to dominate the
market when x ≫ 0 and Player 2 has the advantage when x ≪ 0. For simplification, Ki’s
are not directly affected by (Mt). By construction, the profit rates and all other parameters
are symmetric (about zero), so in equilibrium we expect players to act symmetrically as X
fluctuates from positive to negative and vice versa.
Best-response induction associated to this case study with M = {−1, 0, 1} was the one
sketched in fig. 2 and explained in Section 4.1. We also implement the equilibrium induction
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m −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3
π1m 0.0 1.5 2.8 4.0 5.1 5.9 6.0
π2m 6.0 5.9 5.1 4.0 2.8 1.5 0.0
Table 1: Profit rate ladders πim for Section 5.
(see Section 4.2) for both Case I & II and observe that players behave aggressively when
they have more controls than their rivals in the finite-control scenario. As sketched in fig. 4,
Player 2 will have the “last word” and limt→∞M
∗
t = −1. Consequently, she can behave more
aggressively, be the leader more frequently, and reap higher payoff already in the medium-
term.
5.1 Equilibrium Thresholds
table 2 lists the computed equilibrium thresholds for the three cases. Recall that in Case I
M is restricted to be in {−1, 0, 1}, so Player 1 (P2) is not allowed to act when Mt = +1
(Mt = −1, respectively), hence there is no s1,∗1 or s2,∗−1. Thus, there are 4 total thresholds to
be computed, and 12 equations in the system (44). Due to the symmetric parameter setting,
thresholds of Player 1 are symmetric to thresholds of Player 2 around 0, so in principle
the equilibrium is fully characterized by the pair s1,∗0 , s
1,∗
−1. Similarly, in Case II there are 8
thresholds (4 unique ones) and 24 equations, and in Case III there are 12 thresholds and 36
equations.
A major finding is that the players implement the same thresholds at each interior regime
in all cases. For example, s1,∗0 = 0.94681 in all three Cases I/II/III. Therefore, when in regime
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Figure 5: Equilibrium payoff V 10 (x) of Player 1 for Case I and Case II. Left panel : the dashed
levels indicate D1m; D
1
±1 are the asymptotes of V
1
m for Case I, and D
1
±2 are the asymptotes of
V 1m in Case II. The box denotes the region corresponding to the zoomed-in right panel. Right :
Dashed curves denote the leader payoffs V 1+1(x)−K10 (x) and the follower payoffs V 1−1(x) for
each Case. The same resulting thresholds si,∗0 , i ∈ {1, 2} are adopted in both Cases.
23
Regime π1m π
2
m
Case I Case II Case III
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
+3 6.0 0.0 − 3.47853
+2 5.9 1.5 − 0.25184 13.16216 0.25184
+1 5.1 2.8 − −0.56688 1.90352 −0.56688 1.90352 −0.56688
0 4.0 4.0 0.94861 −0.94861 0.94861 −0.94861 0.94861 −0.94861
−1 2.8 5.1 0.56688 − 0.56688 −1.90352 0.56688 −1.90352
−2 1.5 5.9 −0.25184 − −0.25184 −13.16216
−3 0.0 6.0 −3.47853 −
Table 2: Equilibrium thresholds si,∗m for Cases I, II & III of Section 5.
0, Player 1 “does not see” whether stage +2 is reachable or not, and only makes her decision
based on πi±1. This phenomenon is un-intuitive in the following two aspects. On the one
hand, Player 1 adopts the same equilibrium threshold s1,∗0 = 0.94861 despite the fact that she
can further exercise switches to enhance her dominance at state +1 in Cases II & III. The
latter would be expected to make the switch from 0 to +1 more valuable and therefore make
P1 more aggressive in regime 0. As we see, this intuition, while valid in single-agent contexts,
fails in the constructed equilibrium. On the other hand, players are also myopic about the
multi-step threat from the switches of the other player. For example, P2 implements the
same threshold s2,∗+1 = −0.56688, though in Cases II & III she is facing the threat that P1
may switch the market to an even more disadvantageous regime.
fig. 5(a) plots equilibrium payoffs of Player 1 x 7−→ V 10 (x) (constructed as (21)) when they
are at equal strength M0 = 0 for Case I & II. As expected, V
1
m’s are continuous, increasing
and bounded: V
1,(I)
0 is bounded by D
1
−1 and D
1
+1, while V
1,(II)
0 is bounded by D
1
−2 and D
1
+2.
Note that when these players are at equal strength locally (i.e. X0 = 0) Player 1 has lower
equilibrium payoff in Case II, which can be interpreted as an influence of heavier competition
between them.
The right panel of fig. 5(b) illustrates the nature of the variational inequalities for V 1m.
Dashed lines represent leader payoff V 1+1(x)−K10 from switching (Mt) to (+1) and the follower
payoff V 1−1(x). We have that V
1
0 (x) coincides with V
1
−1(x) for x < s
2,∗
m (stopping region of P2),
and smooth-pastes to V 1+1(x) − K10 (x) at the switching threshold s1,∗0 of P1. As explained,
this switching threshold is the same in Case I and II even though all the game payoffs (in
particular V 10 and V
1
±1) change.
5.2 Macroscopic Market Structure in Equilibrium
Due to the mean-reverting property of the OU process in (36), the resulting M∗ is recurrent.
In particular, at the extreme regimes Mˇ is guaranteed to move back towards zero. table 3
presents the resulting long-run proportion of time M∗ spends at each regime, ρm given by
(24). The table also lists the transition matrix P of the extended jump chain Mˇ , and mean
sojourn times ~ξ for Case I, whence Mˇ takes values in {−1−, 0−, 0+,+1+}. Note that due to
the limited number of regimes, the invariant distribution of Mˇ is uniform, i.e. the original
jump chain M˜ spends half the time at regime 0 and 25% of its time at regimes ±1. Of course,
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the corresponding sojourn times are not equal, so the long-run distribution of M∗ is more
complex.
Regime π1m π
2
m Case I Case II Case III
+3 6.0 0.0 0.00002
+2 5.9 1.5 0.34476 0.34474
+1 5.1 2.8 0.47186 0.12711 0.12711
0 4.0 4.0 0.05628 0.05628 0.05628
−1 2.8 5.1 0.47186 0.12711 0.12711
−2 1.5 5.9 0.34476 0.34474
−3 0.0 6.0 0.00002
P =
(−1)− (0)+ (0)− (+1)+

(−1)− 0 1 0 0
(0)+ 0.205 0 0 0.795
(0)− 0.795 0 0 0.205
(+1)+ 0 0 1 0
,
~ξ =
(−1)− (0)+ (0)− (+1)+( )
4.431 0.264 0.264 4.431 .
Table 3: Equilibrium stationary distribution ρm of M
∗ for Cases I, II & III. Right: Dynamics
of Mˇ∗ in Case I.
From table 2, we observe that the thresholds si,∗0 are quite low, so thatM
∗ does not spend
much time in regime 0 and the market is typically not at “equal strength”. In Case I, only one
level of market dominance is possible and so we observe rapid switches from “equal strength”
to “P1 dominant” or “P2 dominant”, each of which occurs around ρ
(I)
±1 = 47% of the time.
In Case II, because si,∗0 remain the same, we have the same ρ
(II)
0 , so the market continues
to be dominated (but now by different degrees) by one player around 47% of time. Thus,
the long-run distribution of regimes {+1,+2} in Case II can be considered as “splitting” of
those 47% of regime +1 in Case I. Moreover, when one player dominates the market, she will
max-out her dominance most of the time (ρ
(II)
±2 = 34% out of 47%).
A second finding is that one can effectively endogenize the domain M of M . Recall that
concavity of profit rates πim in terms ofm reduces players’ incentive to make further switches if
the game stage is already advantageous. On the contrary, the rival becomes more incentivized
to switch M back towards 0. In the presented example, we make the marginal gain in profit
rates minimal when going from +2 to +3 (and -2 to -3 for Player 2, respectively). As a result,
in Case III there is very little incentive for P1 to switch from +2 to +3, reflected in the very
high equilibrium threshold s2,∗+2 = 13.1621594. Because this threshold is far above the mean-
reverting level θ = 0, it follows that these players are not likely to enhance their dominance up
to the maximum level and regimes ±3 will take place extremely rarely; according to table 3,
M∗ spends less than 0.001% of time in those extreme regimes. Consequently, from a financial
perspective it is reasonable to simply restrict M to be in {−2,−1, 0,+1, 2}, since effectively
ρ
(III)
m ≃ ρ(II)m for all m.
5.3 Effect of Profit Ladder
To isolate the effect of the profit rates πim, we construct threshold-type equilibria with M
restricted to M(IV ) = {−1, 0,+1,+2}, and vary profit rate π12 of Player 1 at stage +2 (all
other profit rates remain as in table 1). Resulting equilibrium thresholds of these players are
sketched in fig. 6 by solid lines. As expected, when π1+2 increases, there is more benefit to
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being in regime +2 and as a result, Player 1 is more willing to make a switch up from +1.
Consequently, she implements lower switching thresholds and s1,∗+1 is decreasing in π
1
+2. On
the contrary, she does not change her threshold s1,∗0 at regime 0, confirming the myopic nature
of equilibrium thresholds discussed in the previous section. However, eventually π1+2−π1+1 is
large enough (or alternatively s1,∗+1 is low enough) to trigger simultaneous switches (s
1,∗
0 > s
1,∗
+1),
so that P1 will pass directly from regime 0 to regime 2 (recall that we assume that this incurs
two switching costs, linearly added). In the latter situation, she switches sooner already in
regime 0, see the extreme right of fig. 6(a), where s1,∗0 starts changing, as soon as s
1,∗
+1 < s
1,∗
0 .
Turning attention to Player 2, her switching threshold s2,∗0 in regime 0 is never affected
by π1+2. Moreover, while her profit rate in regime +2 is unaffected, more aggressive behavior
of P1 who switches into Mt = +2 more frequently, causes her to respond by lowering s
2,∗
+2.
Additionally, in the situation where P1 goes straight from 0 to +2 (π1+2 ≥ 6.25), P2 increases
s2,∗+1, adjusting his strategy in response to a more aggressive strategy of P1 which reduces his
anticipated gain from switching M from +1 to 0. These observations illustrate the complex
feedback effects between thresholds in different market states and the underlying πim’s.
5.4 Effect of Switching Costs
Another essential parameter is the switching cost K. To study the effect of K, we vary the
overall level of switching costs in Ki(x) = ci · (1 + e(−1)iβi). Specifically, we try ci ∈ [0.1, 1],
i.e. from 20% to 200% relative to the baseline ci = 0.5 used in preceding setup, with all other
parameters unchanged. The resulting equilibrium thresholds of Player 1 and her equilibrium
payoff at the “equal strength”, V 10 (0) are sketched in fig. 7 for Case I whereM = {−1, 0,+1}.
Observe that as ci decreases (from the right to the left in fig. 7) P1 adopts lower thresholds
while P2 adopts higher thresholds by symmetry, which means they switch the macro market
environment more frequently. For instance, the expected sojourn time of M˜∗ at regime (+1)+
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Figure 6: Equilibrium switching thresholds si,∗m (P1 on the left, P2 on the right) as the profit
rate π1+2 of P1 varies in Case IV. We use the same type of line for each regime m across the
two panels.
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drops from 6.522 at ci = 1.0 to 1.887 at ci = 0.1, while the expected sojourn time at regime
(0)+ drops from 0.422 at ci = 1.0 to 0.105 at ci = 0.1. Recall that K
i
0(x) is a function of x,
so that lowering the threshold is equivalent to paying more. While lower (single) switching
cost induces more frequent switching, the overall cost of switching still declines, so that
equilibrium payoffs increase as ci declines.
5.5 Multiple Threshold-type Equilibria
As mentioned, existence of multiple threshold-type equilibria is highly likely. According
to theorem 3.4, any suitable solution to the system of non-linear equations is an MNE of
the switching game. This situation arises in Case II above and is “detected” by selecting
different local equilibria during the equilibrium induction of Section 4.2. Specifically, in some
sub-stages there are two different threshold-type equilibria in the local stopping game, which
can be interpreted as “Sooner” (players behave more aggressively and switch quickly once
(Xt) deviates from zero) and “Later” (players are more relaxed and s
i
m are larger in absolute
value). This phenomenon was already documented for stopping games in [2]. Then during
equilibrium induction we consistently choose (i) later equilibria (this is what was done and
reported above in Tables 2-3); (ii) sooner equilibria. This generates two different sequences
of si,∗m , which ultimately yield two different solutions to the nonlinear system, reported in
table 4. We note that in the “Sooner” equilibrium which was described previously, players
effectively skip regimes ±1 as s1,∗0 > s1,∗+1 and s2,∗0 < s2,∗−1. For example, starting atM∗0 = 0 and
X0 = 0, P1 will not switch up until Xt = 1.389 = s
1,∗,S
0 , but then directly go to M
∗ = +2
because 1.389 > 1.029 = s1,∗,S+1 . As a result, the alternative stationary distribution ~ρ
S of
MS,∗ is only supported on {−2, 0, 2} (interestingly, ρS0 > ρL0 so in the aggressive equilibrium
the market is more frequently at “equal strength”). Such multiple instantaneous switches
are indicative of their aggressiveness—once (Xt) moves in their preferred direction, players
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Figure 7: Left : Equilibrium thresholds adopted by P1 as ci varies in [0.1, 1]. Thresholds of
P2 are anti-symmetric about 0. Right : Equilibrium payoff at “equal-strength”, i.e. V 10 (0) =
V 20 (0) due to symmetry.
27
attempt to extract maximum dominance by switching into regime ±2. In line with previous
analysis, the Sooner equilibrium carries lower equilibrium payoffs, as players are penalized for
aggressive interventions that leads to “wasted” effort, e.g. V i,S0 (0) = 33.65 < V
i,L
0 (0) = 33.98.
Remark 6. In Case I there seems to be a unique equilibrium, which we conjecture is due
to having only a single interior regime where players compete simultaneously. Thus, with
M = {−1, 0, 1} we always observe a unique local threshold-type equilibrium during either of
the finite-control inductions. It remains an open problem to establish more precise conditions
regarding equilibrium uniqueness in the infinite-control switching game. Similarly, we do not
have the machinery to check whether further threshold-type equilibria exist in Case II.
−2 −1 0 +1 +2 V i0 (0)
Later
s1,∗,Lm −0.25184 0.56688 0.95861 1.90352 −
33.98s2,∗,Lm − −1.90352 −0.94861 −0.56688 0.25184
ρLm 0.34476 0.12711 0.05628 0.12711 0.34476
Sooner
s1,∗,Sm 0.17983 −0.19139 1.38933 1.02891 −
33.65s2,∗,Sm − −1.02891 −1.38933 0.19139 −0.17983
ρSm 0.41143 0 0.17714 0 0.41143
Table 4: Equilibrium thresholds si,∗m and long-run distribution ~ρ of (M∗t ) associated to two
distinct equilibria in Case II
6 Case Study: Long-run Advantage
Returning to example 2.2, we now consider local market fluctuations X to follow a Geometric
Brownian motion (2) with drift µ = 0.08, volatility σ = 0.25, and discounting rate r = 10%.
Because µ − 12σ2 > 0, limt→∞Xt = +∞ a.s., and so in the long-run Player 1 will dominate
the market since she will eventually have the advantage in terms of X.
The profit rates πim are constant and given by
π1−1 = 0; π
1
0 = 3; π
1
+1 = 5;
π2−1 = 5; π
2
0 = 3; π
2
+1 = 0.
The switching costs Kim’s are again independent of m and driven by X:
K1(x) := (10− x)+, K2(x) := (−2 + x)+. (38)
This case study can be interpreted as competition between an energy producer using a re-
newable resource (Player 1) and a producer using exhaustible resources (Player 2). The
competition is in terms of generating capacity, with Mt denoting the relative production
capacity. Here Xt represents the marginal cost of exhaustibility which connects to the rel-
ative cost of increasing capacity. We expect that Xt → +∞ (“peak oil”); as non-renewable
resources are depleted, P2 becomes noncompetitive. In the long run, P1 will therefore domi-
nate, however there is no upper bound on how many times the competing investments in new
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capacity will take place. Thus, the market will first go through a transient phase where both
producers compete, and then will eventually enter the high-X regime where the renewable
P1 dominates and (endogenously) never relinquishes her advantage.
Expansion Thresholds sim Ave Plants Built
−1 0 +1
Player 1 5.9796 8.9594 - 3.8151
Player 2 - 4.1296 5.9574 2.8151
Table 5: Equilibrium in the GBM case study of Section 6. Average Plants Built refers to the
expected number of switches by player i starting at X0 = 5,M0 = 0.
table 5 shows the resulting equilibrium thresholds, and fig. 8(a) plots a trajectory of (Xt)
and (M∗t ) starting at X0 = 5, M
∗
0 = 0. The right panel fig. 8(b) shows the distribution
of M∗ via t 7→ P(M∗t = m). We observe that Player 2 is likely to make the first expansion
(P(M∗t = −1) increases for low t), while in the medium-term Player 1 becomes more and more
likely to be dominant. In line with Xt → +∞ (due to µ−σ2/2 > 0) we have P(M∗t = +1)→ 1
as t grows. The probability of absorption for Mˇ∗ when moving up from the states (0)± is
(see appendix D.1)
P(+1)a = lim
u↑∞
(s1,∗0 )
1− 2µ
σ2 − (s2,∗1 )1−
2µ
σ2
u1−
2µ
σ2 − (s2,∗+1)1−
2µ
σ2
= 1−
(s1,∗0
s2,∗1
)1− 2µ
σ2 = 0.4709,
M
−
1
0
+
1
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Figure 8: Left : A trajectory of (Xt,M
∗
t ) for the GBM example of Section 6, starting from
X0 = 5, M
∗
0 = 0. Right : Distribution of M
∗
t ∈ {−1, 0, 1} as a function of t.
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leading to the transition probability matrix P of Mˇ∗ as
P =
(−1)− (0)+ (0)− (+1)+ (+1)a

(−1)− 0 1 0 0 0
(0)+ 0.374 0 0 0.331 0.295
(0)− 0.379 0 0 0.329 0.292
(+1)+ 0 0 1 0 0
(+1)a 0 0 0 0 1
. (39)
Note that in the scenario plotted in fig. 8(a), M∗t = +1 after t = 15 which can be interpreted
as “absorption”. The theoretical average time until absorption (defined in (26)) is T0(5) =
30.775. In the Figure we also note that P1 makes 5 switches up and P2 makes 4 switches
down. Recall that on the infinite time horizon P1 will always make one more switch since
M∗t = +1 eventually. The last column of table 5 shows the average number of expansions
implemented by each producer, Ni0(5) defined in (25).
6.1 Effect of the Drift µ and Volatility σ
We examine the effect of the drift µ and volatility σ in (2) on the equilibrium strategies and the
macro market regime M∗. To do so, we evaluate the expected number of expansions carried
out by Player 2 conditional on M0 = 0, N
2
0(5) (which always satisfies N
2
0(5) = N
1
0(5) − 1).
Additionally, we also compute the proportion of time that M∗ spends at each regime m ∈
{−1, 0, 1} in the next T¯ = 30 years, ρm(T¯ ):
ρm(T¯ ) := E
[
1
T¯
∫ T¯
0
1{M∗t =m}
dt
∣∣∣M∗0 = 0
]
. (40)
fig. 9 shows the results as we vary µ from 0.05 to 0.15 with fixed σ = 0.25, or in complement
vary σ ∈ [0.20, 0.25] with fixed µ = 0.08. As expected, higher µ increases the tendency of
(Xt) to go to +∞ and hence enforces the dominance of Player 1; thus Player 2 expands
less. A similar effect holds as σ falls —with less fluctuations there are fewer opportunities
for P2. As a result, the overall number of switches, which can be viewed as the “observable
competition”, decreases as µ increases or σ decreases. A related effect is observed in fig. 9(b):
the dominance of P1, ρ+1(T¯ ), increases as µ rises or σ falls. For µ low (σ high), the transition
to long-run advantage takes place more slowly, so the players are more even-handed in the
medium term on [0, T¯ ). Note that higher volatility hurts Player 1, intensifying the medium-
term competition and causing both players to expend a lot of capital on repeated expansion.
Finally, we remark that the proportion of time M∗ spends in regime 0, ρ0(T¯ ) is quite stable
with respect to different combinations of µ and σ.
7 Conclusion
The above experiments illustrate our constructive approach to dynamic equilibria in repeated
timing games. In particular, the discrete nature of the macro regimeM allows a high degree of
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analytic tractability, including precise quantification of its behavior in equilibrium. The above
was a strong motivation for our reliance on threshold-type equilibria which allow structural
insights into the strategic interaction between the players, the short-term fluctuations in X,
and the emerging M∗.
A natural extension would be to consider other control settings, for instance impulse
control on M (allowing for a continuum of regimes) or singular control. Handling such
extensions must start with precise analysis of the “building block” local problem which in
our case was the constrained optimal stopping in (14). While the latter has been extensively
investigated for optimal stopping, the existing theory for alternative control settings, such as
constrained singular control, remains incomplete.
While our work is rooted in concrete economic applications, we are cognizant that many
realistic aspects of the model have been left out. More sophisticated forms of payoff rates and
switching costs (for example capturing instantaneous supply-demand competition) would be
straightforward to incorporate. Another potential extension is to allow the dynamics of X,
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Figure 9: Left : Average total number of switches exercised by P2. Right : Estimated
proportion of time that (M∗t ) spends in regime m in the next T¯ = 30 years, ρm(T¯ ) from (40),
for each m ∈ M. In all cases we take X0 = 5, M∗0 = 0.
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i.e. the coefficients µ(Xt) and σ(Xt) in (1) to depend on the regime m, which implies that the
generator L needs to be re-indexed as Lm. Modulo technical and notational modifications,
our construction, in particular the system of equations (44) - (45) and the finite-control
approximations in Section 4, should follow straightforwardly.
A much more challenging extension would be to allow for noise in M which amounts
to considering a two- (or in general multi-) dimensional stochastic state process. The main
challenge is that there is very limited theory about constrained optimal stopping in multiple
dimensions—a control now maps into a whole curve si(m) and it is far from clear what the
best-response to such sj(m) ought to look like.
Abstractly, it remains an open question to find other feasible equilibria in the switching
game. We strongly suspect that there is a general lack of equilibrium uniqueness, so the more
fruitful question is to construct other tractable equilibria.
A Solution of the Constrained Optimal Stopping Problem
Let F (·) and a G(·) be the fundamental increasing/decreasing solutions to the ODE:
(L − r)u(x) = 0, x ∈ D, (41)
where L = b(x) ddx + σ
2(x)
2
d2
dx2
is the infinitesimal generator of X. These linearly independent
solutions are positive, continuous, strictly monotone and convex and admit the representa-
tions (see [30, vol.II, p.292])
Ex
{
e−rτa1{τa<∞}
}
=
{
F (x)
F (a) , if x ≤ a,
G(x)
G(a) , if x ≥ a.
(42)
We recall that for the OU process the fundamental solutions are:
FOU (x) :=
∫ ∞
0
u
r
µ
−1
e
√
2µ
σ2
(x−θ)u−u
2
2 du, and GOU (x) :=
∫ ∞
0
u
r
µ
−1
e
−
√
2µ
σ2
(x−θ)u−u
2
2 du,
and for geometric Brownian motion they are:
FGBM (x) := x
η+ , and GGBM (x) := x
η− ,
where η+ and η− are the positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation σ
2
2 η(η − 1) +
µη − r = 0.
Then it is well known that the solution of the constrained optimal stopping problem (14)
is the smallest concave majorant of the transformed leader payoff
Hˆ1(y) :=
hˆ1
G
◦
(
F
G
)−1
(y), and Hˆ2(z) :=
hˆ2
F
◦
(
G
F
)−1
(z), (43)
where hˆi(sj) = max{li, gi}(sj) and hˆi(x) = hi(x) otherwise. Specifically, { V˜ 1G }(F (x)/G(x))
(resp. { V˜ 2F }(G(x)/F (x))) is the concave envelope of Hˆ i(·). To ensure that this concave
envelope is of threshold-type we invoke the following definition, cf. de Angelis et al. [15]:
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Definition A.1. Let H be the class of real valued functions h ∈ C2(D) such that lim sup
x→d
∣∣∣∣ h(x)G(x)
∣∣∣∣ =
lim sup
x→d¯
∣∣∣∣ h(x)F (x)
∣∣∣∣ = 0, and Ex [∫∞0 e−rt |(L − r)h (Xt)| dt] < ∞ for all x ∈ D. Denote by Hinc
(resp. Hdec) the set of all h ∈ H such that x 7→ (L−r)h(x) is strictly positive (resp. negative)
on (d, xh) and strictly negative (resp. positive) on (xh, d¯) for some xh ∈ D.
When the leader payoff h1 (resp. h2) is in the class Hinc (resp. Hdec) and assumption 3.2
(iii) holds it follows that the transformed Hˆ i is convex and then concave. Consequently, its
smallest concave majorant is a straight line which is tangent to Hˆ i at a unique point, and
then coincides with Hˆ i.
This construction reduces to determining the tangency point of Hˆ i, corresponding to the
transformed threshold si(sj). Moreover, the coefficient ω˜i in proposition 3.3 corresponds to
the slope of the above straight line segment and ν˜i corresponds to the y-intercept. From the
fact that being a follower is assumed to sub-optimal at Li, it follows that ω˜
1, ν˜2 ≥ 0 and
ν˜1, ω˜2 ≤ 0. We refer the reader to [2] for further details.
The case where assumption 3.2 (iii) is violated leads to a unique preemptive equilibrium
in (14) see [2, Section 3] for detailed discussion.
B Proof of theorem 3.4
We first state the full system of nonlinear equations characterizing the thresholds si,∗ and
coefficients ωi, νi in (21). First for each m /∈ {m,m} there are 6 equations:
{
V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m
}
(s1,∗m ) ·W (s1,∗m , s2,∗m )−
{
V 1m−1 −D1m
}
(s2,∗m ) ·W (s1,∗m , s1,∗m )
−{V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m}′ (s1,∗m ) · W(s1,∗m , s2,∗m ) = 0,{
V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m
}
(s1,∗m ) ·G(s2,∗m )−
{
V 1m−1 −D1m
}
(s2,∗m ) ·G(s1,∗m )− ω1m · W(s1,∗m , s2,∗m ) = 0,{
V 1m−1 −D1m
}
(s2,∗m ) · F (s1,∗m )−
{
V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m
}
(s1,∗m ) · F (s2,∗m )− ν1m · W(s1,∗m , s2,∗m ) = 0,
(44a)
{
V 2m−1 −D2m −K2m
}
(s2,∗m ) ·W (s2,∗m , s1,∗m )−
{
V 2m+1 −D2m
}
(s1,∗m ) ·W (s2,∗m , s2,∗m )
−{V 2m−1 −D2m −K2m}′ (s2,∗m ) · W(s1,∗m , s2,∗m ) = 0,{
V 2m−1 −D2m −K2m
}
(s2,∗m ) ·G(s1,∗m )−
{
V 2m+1 −D2m
}
(s1,∗m ) ·G(s2,∗m )− ω2m · W(s2,∗m , s1,∗m ) = 0,{
V 2m+1 −D2m
}
(s1,∗m ) · F (s2,∗m )−
{
V 2m−1 −D2m −K2m
}
(s2,∗m ) · F (s1,∗m )− ν2m · W(s2,∗m , s1,∗m ) = 0,
(44b)
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where F and G are the solutions to the ODE (41), and W (·, ·),W(·, ·) are from (15). In
boundary regimes m = m and m = m we have the following systems of 3 equations:
s1,∗m = d, ω
1
m = 0, ν
1
m = 0,{
V 1m−1 −D1m
}
(s2,∗m )− ν1m ·G(s2,∗m ) = 0,{
V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m
}
(s1,∗m ) · F ′(s1,∗m )−
{
V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m
}′
(s1,∗m ) · F (s1,∗m ) = 0,{
V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m
}
(s1,∗m )− ω1m · F (s1,∗m ) = 0,
(45a)

s2,∗m = d, ω2m = 0, ν
2
m = 0,{
V 2m−1 −D2m −K2m
}
(s2,∗m ) ·G′(s2,∗m )−
{
V 2m+1 −D2m −K2m
}′
(s2,∗m ) ·G(s2,∗m ) = 0,{
V 2m−1 −D2m −K2m
}
(s2,∗m )− ν2m ·G(s2,∗m ) = 0,{
V 2m+1 −D2m
}
(s1,∗m )− ω2m · F (s1,∗m ) = 0.
(45b)
Proof of theorem 3.4. To begin with, we argue that by construction of V i’s in (21) we have:
1. V im ∈ C2
(D \ (si ∪ sj)) ∩ C1 (D \ sj) ∩ C (D), for ∀m ∈ M, i ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j;
2. V im is at most linear growth, i.e.
|V im(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|), for ∀x ∈ D; (46)
3. V i’s satisfy the following system of variational inequalities (VIs) for m < m:
V 1m+1 −K1m − V 1m ≤ 0, in D, (47a)
V 1m−1 − V 1m = 0, in Γ2,∗m , (47b)
V 2m+1 − V 2m = 0, in Γ1,∗m , (47c)
max
{
(L − r)V 1m + π1m, V 1m+1 −K1m − V 1m
}
= 0, in D \ Γ2,∗m , (47d)
and for m > m,
V 2m−1 −K2m − V 2m ≤ 0, in D, (48a)
V 1m−1 − V 1m = 0, in Γ2,∗m , (48b)
V 2m+1 − V 2m = 0, in Γ1,∗m , (48c)
max
{
(L − r)V 2m + π2m, V 2m−1 −K2m − V 2m
}
= 0, in D \ Γ1,∗m . (48d)
The smoothness of V i follows directly from the regularity of F (·) and G(·) and the piecewise
construction. The second statement follows from the linear growth assumption imposed on
Di’s in (7) and signs of coefficients ωi, νi. Note that this is a natural property of correct
equilibrium payoffs since the best-response game payoff of player i satisfies
min
m∈M
Dim(x) ≤ V˜ im(x;αj) ≤ max
m∈M
Dim(x), (49)
and a MNE is characterized as a fixed-point of best-responses. The key is the last assertion;
we show (47), with (48) then following analogously. Comparing the system (44) for fixed m
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with (17) and (18), one can see that V 1m −D1m is indeed the solution to the optimal stopping
problem (14) with
h1m(x) := V
1
m+1(x)−D1m(x)−K1m(x),
l1m(x) := V
1
m−1(x)−D1m(x),
which in turn brings the restriction on signs of ωi,νi. Taking P1 as an example, ω1m corre-
sponds to the slope of the straight line segment of its transformed smallest concave majorant
which ought be positive for m < m and equal to zero for m = m. Similarly, ν1m corresponds
to the y-intercept of that line segment which ought to be negative for m > m and equal to
zero for m = m. Furthermore, the signs of the derivatives of F (·), G(·) imply that V 1m−D1m is
increasing. The assumption V 1m−1(s
2,∗) ≥ V 1m+1(s2,∗m )−K1m(s2,∗m ), for m > m plus the smallest
concave majorant characterization then yields
V 1m −D1m = l1m ≥ h1m = V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m, in Γ2,∗m ,
V 1m −D1m = h1m = V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m, in Γ1,∗m ,
V 1m −D1m ≥ h1m = V 1m+1 −D1m −K1m, in D \
(
Γ1,∗m ∪ Γ2,∗m
)
,
which shows (47a). (47b) and (47c) are obtained directly from the construction of V i’s,
reflecting the payoff in x-states where the rival switches immediately. Lastly, to check (47d),
recall that the discounted cash flows in (7) satisfy (L− r)Dim = −πim, and by their definition
(L − r)F = (L − r)G = 0. For x ∈ D\ (Γ2,∗m ∪Γ1,∗m ) (“the no-action region”) we have by (21)
that V 1m(x) = D
1
m(x) + ω
1
mF (x) + ν
1
mG(x), so applying the operator (L − r) we get
(L − r)V 1m + π1m = (L − r)D1m + π1m = −π1m + π1m = 0, x ∈ D \ (Γ2,∗m ∪ Γ1,∗m ).
For x ∈ Γ1,∗m \Γ1,∗m+1, we have V 1m(x) = V 1m+1(x)−K1m(x) = D1m+1(x)+ω1m+1F (x)+ν1m+1G(x)−
K1m so that
(L − r)V 1m + π1m = (L − r)
(
V 1m+1 −K1m
)
+ π1m
= (L − r)D1m+1 + (L − r)
(−K1m)+ π1m (50)
= (L − r) (D1m+1 −D1m −K1m) < 0, (51)
where the last inequality (51) is due to D1m+1 −D1m −K1m ∈ Hinc. Similar arguments apply
to x ∈ Γ1,∗m+1 \ Γ1,∗m+2 where two simultaneous switches by P1 will take place; by induction we
conclude that (L − r)V 1m + π1m < 0 for x ∈ Γ1,∗m , establishing (47d).
We now prove
(
s
1,∗, s2,∗
)
is a Nash equilibrium. To do so, we first consider the point of
view of P1, letting α1 = {τ1(n) : n ≥ 1} be her arbitrary strategy satisfying (α1, s2,∗) ∈ A,
and (σn)n≥0 be the sequence of resulting switching times defined in (3), withX0 = x, M˜0 = m.
As a first step, we use induction to establish that
V 1m(x) ≥ E
[ ∫ σn
0
e−rtπ1(Xxt , M˜η(t))dt−
n∑
k=1
1{Pk=1}e
−rσk ·K1(Xσk , M˜k−1)+ e−rσnV 1M˜n(Xxσn)] ∀n ≥ 1.
(52)
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For n = 1, since σ1 = τ
1(1)∧ τ2,∗m , applying Itoˆ’s formula to the process e−rtV 1m(Xxt ) over
the interval [0, σ1] and taking expectations yields
V 1m(x) = E
[
−
∫ σ1
0
e−rt (L − r)V 1m (Xxt ) dt+ e−rσ1V 1m(Xxσ1)
]
≥ E
[ ∫ σ1
0
e−rtπ1(Xxt , M˜0)dt+ e
−rσ1V 1m(X
x
σ1)
]
(53a)
≥ E
[ ∫ σ1
0
e−rtπ1(Xxt , M˜0)dt+ e
−rσ1{−K1(Xxσ1 , M˜0) · 1{σ1=τ1(1)} + V 1M˜1(X
x
σ1)}
]
,
(53b)
where the inequality (53a) follows from (47d) and the fact that σ1 ≤ τ2,∗m , and the inequality
(53b) is due to (47a) and (47b):
E
[
V 1m(X
x
σ1)
]
≥ E
[
1{σ1=τ1(1)}
{
V 1m+1(X
x
σ1)−K1(Xxσ1 , M˜0)
}
+ 1{σ1=τ2,∗m }V
1
m−1(X
x
σ1)
]
. (54)
Next we show (52) for n = 2. By construction, we have σ2 = τ
1(2)∧ (σ1+ τ2,∗M˜1). Consider
the second-round sub-game started at initial state Xxσ1 ; applying Itoˆ’s formula to the process
e−rtV 1m+1
(
X
Xxσ1
t
)
over the interval [0, σ2 − σ1] and taking expectation conditional on F˜ (2)σ1 ,
cf. (3a), we obtain
V 1m+1(X
x
σ1) ≥ E
[ ∫ σ2−σ1
0
e−rtπ1
(
X
Xxσ1
t ,m+ 1
)
dt+ e−r(σ2−σ1)V 1
M˜2
(
Xxσ2
)
− 1{σ2=τ1(2)}e−r(σ2−σ1) ·K1(Xxσ2 ,m+ 1)
∣∣∣ F˜ (2)σ1 ],
analogously to (53b) and replacing X
Xxσ1
σ2−σ1 by X
x
σ2 based on the strong Markov property of
(Xt). Furthermore, using
∫ σ2
σ1
e−rtπ1(Xxt ,m+1)dt = e
−rσ1
∫ σ2−σ1
0 e
−rtπ1
(
X
Xxσ1
s ,m+1
)
ds we
have
E
[
1{σ1=τ1(1)}e
−rσ1V 1m+1(X
x
σ1)
]
≥E
[
1{σ1=τ1(1)} ·
[ ∫ σ2
σ1
e−rtπ1
(
Xxt ,m+ 1
)
dt+ e−rσ2V 1
M˜2
(
Xxσ2
)]
− 1{σ2=τ1(2)}1{σ1=τ1(1)}e−rσ2 ·K1(Xxσ2 ,m+ 1)
]
.
(55)
Similarly, we have
E
[
1
{σ1=τ
2,∗
m }
e−rσ1V 1m−1(X
x
σ1)
]
≥ E
[
1
{σ1=τ
2,∗
m }
·
[ ∫ σ2
σ1
e−rtπ1
(
Xxt ,m− 1
)
dt+ e−rσ2V 1
M˜2
(
Xxσ2
)]
− 1{σ2=τ1(2)}1{σ1=τ2,∗m }e
−rσ2 ·K1(Xxσ2 ,m− 1)
]
.
(56)
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Substituting (55) - (56) into (53b), we obtain
V 1m(x) ≥ E
[ ∫ σ1
0
e−rtπ1(Xxt , M˜0)dt+
∫ σ2
σ1
e−rtπ1(Xxt ,m+ 1)dt
+ e−rσ2V 1
M˜2
(Xxσ2)− 1{σ1=τ1(1)}e−rσ1K1(Xxσ1 , M˜0)
− 1{σ2=τ1(2)}1{σ1=τ1(1)}e−rσ2 ·K1(Xxσ2 ,m+ 1)− 1{σ2=τ1(2)}1{σ1=τ2,∗m }e
−rσ2 ·K1(Xxσ2 ,m− 1)
= E
[ ∫ σ2
0
e−rtπ1(Xxt , M˜η(t))dt−
2∑
k=1
1{Pk=1}e
−rσk ·K1(Xσk , M˜k−1)+ e−rσ2V 1M˜2(Xxσ2)].
Iterating this argument for n = 3, . . . , establishes (52). Let us remark that the above
works without any modifications in the boundary regimes m ∈ {m,m}, where τ1(n) or τ2,∗m
are set to be infinite. Since V 1m is at most of linear growth from (46) and admissibility of
(α1, s2,∗) requires limn→∞ σn = +∞, dominated convergence theorem implies
V 1m(x) ≥ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtπ1(Xxt , M˜η(t))dt−
∑
k=1
1{Pk=1}e
−rσk ·K1(Xσk , M˜k−1)] = J1m(x;α1, s2,∗).
(57)
Similarly for P2 we obtain that
V 2m(x) ≥ J2m(x; s1,∗,α2), for ∀(s1,∗,α2) ∈ A.
Last but not least, one can verify that replacing α1 by s1,∗ in above argument leads to
σ1 = τ
1,∗
m ∧τ2,∗m so that (L − r)V 1m (Xxt ) = −π1(Xxt , M˜0) on [0, σ1) and V 1m(Xxt ) = V 1m+1(Xxt )−
K1m(X
x
t ) at σ1 = τ
1,∗
m and V 1m(X
x
t ) = V
1
m−1(X
x
t ) at σ1 = τ
2,∗
m . These turn inequalities in (53a)
and (53b) into equalities, and inductively yield
V 1m(x) = J
1
m(x; s
1,∗, s2,∗),
which, combining with (57), completes the proof.
C Proof of proposition 4.1
Let X0 = x ∈ D , M0 = m ∈ M, and fix sj. The best-response of player i with N i ≥ 1
controls is
V˜ i,(N
i)
m (x ; s
j) = sup
αi,(N
i)∈Ai,(Ni)
J im(x ;α
i,(N i), sj), (58)
where
Ai,(N i) := {(αi, sj) ∈ A : τ i(n) = +∞, n > η(i,N i)} , (59)
with η(i,N i) defined in (5) denotes the round at which player i exercises her N i-th switch.
Since Ai,(N i) ⊆ Ai,(N i+1) we have that N i 7→ V˜ i,(N i)m (x ; sj) is non-decreasing. Moreover, since
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V˜
i,(N i)
m (x ; sj) is bounded from above by maxmD
i
m(x), limn→∞ V˜
i,(N i)
m (x ; sj) is well-defined.
It remains to show that this limit is V˜ im(x ; s
j).
Because Ai,(N i) ⊆ {αi : (αi, sj) ∈ A}, we trivially obtain
lim
N i→∞
V˜ i,(N
i)
m (x ; s
j) ≤ V˜ im(x ; sj). (60)
To obtain the opposite inequality, for any ε > 0, let αiε := {τ iε(n) : n ≥ 1} (which depends
on x) be a ε-optimal strategy satisfying (αiε, s
j) ∈ A and
J im(x ;α
i
ε, s
j) ≥ V˜ im(x ; sj)− ε. (61)
Now for a fixed N i ≥ 1 we define the respective truncated N i-finite strategy αi,(N i)ε :=
{τ i,(N i)ε (n) : n ≥ 1} as
τ i,(N
i)
ε (n) =
{
τ iε(n), n ≤ η(i,N i)
+∞, o.w.
(62)
Thus, the truncated strategy stops switching completely after the first N i switches. Denote
by M
(N i)
t the resulting macro regime and by (σ
i,(N i)
k )k≤N i the sequence of switching times of
player i, cf. (5), based on (α
i,(N i)
ε , sj), which we compare against the corresponding M
(∞)
t
and (σ
i,(∞)
k )k≥1 based on the non-truncated (α
i
ε, s
j). By the construction of the truncation,
σ
i,(N i)
k = σ
i
k, for k ≤ N i, M (N
i)
t =Mt, for t ≤ σiN i ,
and the two cashflows completely match up to σ
i,(∞)
N i
. In the truncated version, thereafter
only the other player i applies her controls. Since σ
i,(∞)
N i
→∞ as N i →∞ from admissibility
of αiε, it follows that there exists N
ε > 1 s.t. for ∀N > N ε
Ex,m
[∫ ∞
σi
N
e−rt|πi(Xt,M (∞)t )| dt
]
< ε; (63a)
Ex,m
[∫ ∞
σi
N
e−rt|πi(Xt,M (N)t )| dt
]
< ε; (63b)
Ex,m
[
∞∑
k=N+1
e−rσ
i,(∞)
k Ki
(
X
σ
i,(∞)
k
, M˜
(∞)
η(i,k)−1
)
·
]
< ε. (63c)
For the second bound we use the fact thatM has a finite state space so that |πi(Xt,M (N)t )| ≤
maxm |πi(Xt,m)| which still satisfies the growth condition. Using (63) and (6) we have for
N > N ε∣∣J im(x ;αi,(N)ε , sj)− J im(x ;αiε, sj)∣∣ ≤ Ex,m[∫ ∞
σi,∞
N
e−rt
(|πi (Xt,M (∞)t ) |+ |πi(Xt,M (N)t )|)dt
+
∞∑
k=N+1
e−rσ
i,(∞)
k Ki
(
X
σ
i,(∞)
k
, M˜
(∞)
η(i,k)−1
)]
≤ 3ε. (64)
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By Fatou’s lemma and (64) we obtain
lim inf
N→∞
J im(x ;α
i,(N)
ε , s
j) = lim inf
N→∞
Ex,m
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtπi(Xt,M
(N)
t )dt−
N∑
k=1
Ki
(
X
σ
i,(N)
k
, M˜
(N)
η(i,k)−1
)
· e−rσi,(N)k
]
≥ J im(x ;αiε, sj)− 3ε. (65)
In turn, from (61), we get
lim inf
N→∞
V˜ i,(N)m (x ; s
j) ≥ lim inf
N→∞
J im(x ;α
i,(N)
ε , s
j) ≥ V˜ im(x ; sj)− 4ε, (66)
which along with (60) and letting ε ↓ 0 completes the proof.
D Dynamics of M˜∗ in Threshold-type Equilibrium
In this Appendix, we present computational details related to the macro market equilibrium
described in Section 3.4. While the computations are largely classical, we state them for the
completeness and the reader’s convenience. For ease of presentation we consider the case
where si,∗m ’s are in strictly ascending/descending order in terms of m, so that all transitions
of M∗ are by ±1.
D.1 Transition probabilities of Mˇ∗ in interior states
Conditional on Mˇ∗n−1 ∈ {m−,m+} and m /∈ ∂M, we have that (X˜(n) being defined in (11a))
Mˇ∗n =
{
(m+ 1)+, if X˜
(n)
t hits s
1,∗
m before s
2,∗
m ,
(m− 1)−, if X˜(n)t hits s2,∗m before s1,∗m ,
(67)
with the starting position X˜
(n)
0 = s
1,∗
m−1 if Mˇ
∗
n = m
+ and X˜
(n)
0 = s
2,∗
m+1 if Mˇ
∗
n = m
−. Let us
use Xx to denote a generic copy of X started at X0 = x and consider the two-sided passage
times
τ(x; a, b) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ a or Xxt ≥ b}, (a, b) ⊃ x.
Thus we have:
Pm+,(m+1)+ = P
[
X
s1,∗m−1
τ(s1,∗m−1;s
2,∗
m ,s
1,∗
m )
= s1,∗m
]
, Pm+,(m−1)− = P
[
X
s1,∗m−1
τ(s1,∗m−1;s
2,∗
m ,s
1,∗
m )
= s2,∗m
]
,
Pm−,(m+1)+ = P
[
X
s2,∗m+1
τ(s2,∗m+1;s
2,∗
m ,s
1,∗
m )
= s1,∗m
]
, Pm−,(m−1)− = P
[
X
s2,∗m+1
τ(s2,∗m+1;s
2,∗
m ,s
1,∗
m )
= s2,∗m
]
.
(68)
In turn we recall that (68) can evaluated via the scale function S(·) of (Xt) (see Ch VII.3 of
[28]):
P
[
Xxτ(x;a,b) = b
]
=
S(x)− S(a)
S(b)− S(a) , P
[
Xxτ(x;a,b) = a
]
=
S(b)− S(x)
S(b)− S(a) . (69)
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Recall that S is the continuous, increasing general solution to the ODE LS = 0 that is
available in closed-form for linear diffusions.
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Process. The scale function S(·) solves
µ(θ − x)S′(x) + 1
2
σ2S′′(x) = 0, ⇒ SOU(x) =
∫ x
−∞
e
µ
σ2
(z−θ)2dz, x ∈ R.
Geometric Brownian motion. The scale function S(·) solves
µxS′(x) +
1
2
σ2x2S′′(x) = 0, ⇒ SGBM (x) = x1−2µ/σ2 , x ∈ R+.
D.2 Transition probabilities of Mˇ∗ in boundary regimes
Recall that at regimes m−,m+ only one player can switch. For a recurrent X, she is guar-
anteed to do so eventually and we simply have
Pm−,(m+1)+ = Pm+,(m−1)− = 1. (70)
When X is transient, one player will be permanently dominant in the long-run and at
least one of the following absorbing probabilities
Pma := P
[
X
s2,∗m+1
t ≤ s1,∗m ∀t
]
= lim
d↓d
P
[
X
s2,∗m+1
τ(s2,∗m+1;d,s
1,∗
m )
= d
]
,
Pma := lim
u↑d
P
[
X
s1,∗
m−1
τ(s1,∗m−1;s
2,∗
m ,u)
= u
]
,
(71)
are strictly positive. Namely, when M∗ enters a boundary regime, there is a positive proba-
bility that M∗ will stay constant henceforth. To address this, we use the states {ma, ma} of
the extended Mˇ that are entered from the regime adjacent to the corresponding boundary.
For instance, three transitions are possible from Mˇ∗n−1 ∈ {(m− 1)−, (m− 1)+}:
Mˇ∗n =

up to ma, if X˜
(n)
t hits s
1,∗
m−1 before s
2,∗
m−1 and Mˇ
∗ gets absorbed ,
up to m+, if X˜
(n)
t hits s
1,∗
m−1 before s
2,∗
m−1 and Mˇ
∗ is not absorbed ,
down to (m− 2)−, if X˜(n)t hits s2,∗m−1 before s1,∗m−1 .
(72)
Probabilistically, we may interpret absorption as an independent “coin toss” at the transition
out of (m− 1)±, so that using (71)
P(m−1)+,ma = P
[
X
s1,∗m−2
τ(s1,∗
m−2;s
2,∗
m−1,s
1,∗
m−1)
= s1,∗m−1
]× Pma, (73)
P(m−1)+,m+ = P
[
X
s1,∗m−2
τ(s1,∗
m−2;s
2,∗
m−1,s
1,∗
m−1)
= s1,∗m−1
]× (1− Pma), (74)
P(m−1)+,(m−2)− = 1− P(m−1)+,ma − P(m−1)+,m+ . (75)
Similar computations are used for P(m−1)−,·,P(m+1)−,·,P(m−1)+,·.
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D.3 Average sojourn times of Mˇ∗
The expected sojourn times ~ξ of M∗ in (23), or equivalently expected inter-arrival times
between jumps of Mˇ∗ correspond to the mean two-sided exit time, δab(x) := E
[
τ(x; a, b)
]
, x ∈
(a, b), namely
ξm− := E
[
τ(s2,∗m+1; s
2,∗
m , s
1,∗
m )
]
, ξm+ := E
[
τ(s1,∗m−1; s
2,∗
m , s
1,∗
m )
]
, (76)
for m /∈ ∂M. Applying Dynkin’s formula, it is well known that δab(·) solves the ODE
Lδ + 1 = 0 with boundary conditions δab(a) = δab(b) = 0.
Geometric Brownian motion. The expected exit time δab(·) is a solution to
µxδ′ab(x) +
1
2
σ2x2δ′′ab(x) + 1 = 0, x ∈ (a, b), and δab(a) = δab(b) = 0.
Solving we obtain
δab(x) =
(
1
2
σ2 − µ
)−1ln(xa)+ ln(ab )
(
x1−2µ/σ
2 − a1−2µ/σ2
)
b1−2µ/σ2 − a1−2µ/σ2
 , x ∈ (a, b).
D.4 One-sided exit times and sojourn times in boundary regimes
To compute mean sojourn times ξm− , ξm+ we make use of the one-sided passage times
τ(x; s) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt = s}.
If the corresponding absorbing probability (71) is zero, we have
ξm− := E
[
τ(s2,∗m+1; s
1,∗
m )
]
, ξm+ := E
[
τ(s1,∗m−1; s
2,∗
m )
]
.
Otherwise, we condition on the exit time τ being finite, denoting δs(x) = E[τ(x; s)1{τ(x;s)<∞}].
Then, e.g.
ξm+ = E
[
τ(s1,∗m−1; s
2,∗
m )
∣∣τ(s1,∗m−1; s2,∗m ) <∞] = 11− Pma δs2,∗m (s1,∗m−1). (77)
Computing δs(x). We re-write
δs(x) = − ∂
∂ρ
Ex
[
e−ρτ(x;s)1{τ(x;s)<∞}
]∣∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
,
and use the well-known result [13] about the Laplace transform of τ(x; s),
Ex
[
e−ρτ(x;s)1{τ(x;s)<∞}
]
=
{
F (x;ρ)
F (a;ρ) , if x ≤ s,
G(x;ρ)
G(a;ρ) , if x ≥ s,
(78)
where F (·; ρ) and G(·; ρ) are solutions to (L − ρ)u = 0 (recall proposition 3.3) and we
emphasize their dependence on the Laplace parameter ρ.
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Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Following from (78), the expected first passage time δs(x) to
a level s is admitted as
δs(x) =
√
2π
µ

∫ (s−θ)√ 2µσ2
(x−θ)
√
2µ
σ2
Φ (z) e
1
2
z2dz
 1{s≥x} +
∫ (θ−s)√ 2µσ2
(θ−x)
√
2µ
σ2
Φ (z) e
1
2
z2dz
 1{s<x}
 ,
(79)
where Φ is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function. The expected exit time
from an interval x ∈ (a, b), δab(x) can then be obtained via
δab(x) =
δa(x)δb(a) + δb(x)δa(b)− δa(b)δb(a)
δb(a) + δa(b)
. (80)
Geometric Brownian motion. GBM is non-recurrent; suppose that µ − 12σ2 > 0 so that
ma is the absorbing regime. Then from (78) we compute
δs2,∗
m
(s1,∗m−1) = E
[
τ(s1,∗m−1; s
2,∗
m )1{τ(s1,∗
m−1;s
2,∗
m
)<∞}
]
=
1
µ− 12σ2
· ln
(s1,∗m−1
s2,∗m
)
·
(s1,∗m−1
s2,∗m
)1− 2µ
σ
.
D.5 Expected number of switches until absorption under non-recurrent
(Xt)
Without loss of generality, let us assume thatm is the absorbing regime, so that limt→∞M
∗
t =
m. Define
υupe :=E
[
#up-moves before Mˇ∗ hits ma | Mˇ∗0 = e
]
, e ∈ E \ {ma},
υdne :=E
[
#down-moves before Mˇ∗ hits ma | Mˇ∗0 = e
]
, e ∈ E \ {ma},
where E is the state space of Mˇ from (22) and P is the transition matrix of Mˇ∗. Let
P−a be the sub-matrix with the row and column corresponding to m
a removed. Define
~υup := [υup
m−
, · · · , υup
m+
]T , ~υdn := [υdnm− , · · · , υdnm+ ]T , ~P up := [P
up
m−
, · · · , P up
m+
]T and ~P dn :=
[P dnm− , · · · , P dnm+ ]T , with{
P up
m±
:= Pm±,(m+1)+ , for m < m− 1, P upm+ := 0,
P dnm± := Pm±,(m−1)− , for m > m, P
dn
m− := 0,
and P up
(m−1)±
:= P(m−1)±,m+ + P(m−1)±,ma . Then we obtain
~υup = (I − P−a)−1 ~P up and ~υdn = (I − P−a)−1 ~P dn, (81)
and after taking care of the initial condition X0 = x which leads to a non-standard first
transition probability, obtain the expected number of switches defined in (25)
N
1
m(x) = Px,m
[
Mˇ∗1 = (m+ 1)
+
]× (υup
(m+1)+
+ 1
)
+ Px,m
[
Mˇ∗1 = (m− 1)−
]× υup
(m−1)−
,
N
2
m(x) = Px,m
[
Mˇ∗1 = (m+ 1)
+
]× υdn(m+1)+ + Px,m[Mˇ∗1 = (m− 1)−]× (υdn(m−1)− + 1). (82)
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In general Px,m
[
Mˇ∗1 = (m + 1)
+
]
= P(Xx
τ(x;s2,∗m ,s
1,∗
m )
= s1,∗m ); however one must also consider
the situation when M∗0 = m − 1, so that Mˇ∗1 = ma becomes possible, and also M∗0 = m, in
which case one must assign Mˇ0 = m
a or Mˇ0 = m
+ according to the probability Pma(x) :=
limu↑d P
[
Xx
τ(x;s2,∗m ,u)
= u
]
.
D.6 Non-recurrent (Xt): expected time until absorption
To begin with, we need the expected number of visits to each non-absorbing regime. Define
Ve1,e2 := E
[
#visits to e2 before Mˇ
∗ reaches ma
∣∣∣∣ Mˇ∗0 = e1], for all e1, e2 ∈ E \ {ma},
and let V denote the matrix of Ve1,e2 with rows ~Ve1,· :=
[Ve1,m− , . . . ,Ve1,m+], for e1 ∈ E\{ma}.
Then from standard Markov chain arguments,
V = (I − P−a)−1,
where P−a is the transient transition sub-matrix defined in the preceding subsection. Mul-
tiplying by the respective sojourn times ξm, the expected absorption time starting from an
arbitrary regime e ∈ E \ {ma} is T˜e := ~Ve,· · ~ξ−a, where ~ξ−a is the vector of expected sojourn
times excluding ξma . Finally, the expected time until M
∗ gets absorbed, as defined in (26),
is admitted as (cf. (82))
Tm(x) = Ex
[
τ(x; s2,∗m , s
1,∗
m )
]
+ Px,m
[
Mˇ∗1 = (m+ 1)
+
]× T˜(m+1)+ + Px,m[Mˇ∗1 = (m− 1)−]× T˜(m−1)− .
Again further adjustments are needed when M∗0 = m − 1 or M∗0 = m as discussed in the
preceding subsection.
E Proof of corollary 3.6
Proof. From (27b) and (27c), we write V 1+1(x) explicitly for x ≥ sˇ by substituting in the
respective expressions for ν1+1 and ω
1
−1:
V 1+1(x) = D
1
+1(x) + ν
1
+1G(x)
= D1+1(x) +
V 1−1(−sˇ)−D1+1(−sˇ)
G(−sˇ) G(x)
= D1+1(x) +
D1−1(−sˇ) + ω1−1F (−sˇ)−D1+1(−sˇ)
G(−sˇ) G(x)
= D1+1(x) +
G(x)
G(−sˇ)
[
(V 1+1 −D1−1 −K1−1)(sˇ)
F (−sˇ)
F (sˇ)
+D1−1(−sˇ)−D1+1(−sˇ)
]
.
The above gives an equation relating V 1+1(x) to V
1
+1(sˇ); therefore, if one defines
Q(s) :=
D1+1(s)− G(s)G(−s)
[(
D1−1(s) +K
1
−1(s)
)F (−s)
F (s) +D
1
+1(−s)−D1−1(−s)
]
1− G(s)G(−s) F (−s)F (s)
, (83)
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and let sˇ be a solution to the system (27), then it holds Q(sˇ) = V 1+1(sˇ). Similarly, after
differentiating with respect to x (guaranteed by corollary 3.6 which requires smoothness of
D1m(·) and K1m(·)), one can define
q(s) := D1
′
+1(s) +
G′(s)
G(−s)
[
(Q(s)−D1−1(s)−K1−1(s))
F (−s)
F (s)
+D1−1(−s)−D1+1(−s)
]
, (84)
and conclude q(sˇ) = V 1
′
+1(sˇ). Then replacing V
1
+1(x) by Q(x) and (V
1
+1)
′(x) by q(x) in (27a)
we obtain that solving the system (27) is equivalent to finding the root(s) of
Z(s) := [Q(s)−D1−1(s)−K1−1(s)]F ′(s)− [q(s)− (D1−1)′(s)− (K1−1)′(s)]F (s) = 0, (85)
Since sˇ > s2,∗+1 = −sˇ =⇒ sˇ > 0 (otherwise the switching regions would overlap), we seek
positive solutions to (85). We shall show that Z(0) < 0 and Z(s) > 0 for s large enough,
which by continuity (as each term in (85) is continuous) implies the existence of a root.
On the one hand, the numerator of Q(s) at s = 0 is admitted as
D1+1(0)−
G(0)
G(0)
[(
D1−1(0) +K
1
−1(0)
)F (0)
F (0)
+D1+1(0)−D1−1(0)
]
= −K1−1(0) < 0,
while the denominator 1− G(s)G(−s) F (−s)F (s) = 1−
(F (−s)
F (s)
)2
is strictly positive (F (·) is increasing)
for s > 0 and tends to zero as s ↓ 0, so that lims↓0Q(s) = −∞. Furthermore,
lim
s↓0
q(s) = (D1+1)
′(0) +
G′(0)
G(0)
[
(lim
s↓0
Q(s)−D1−1(0) −K1−1(0))
F (0)
F (0)
+D1−1(0) −D1+1(0)
]
= +∞,
since G(·) is positive and decreasing (G′(·) < 0) while all other terms beyond lims↓0Q(s) are
finite. Putting everything together,
lim
s↓0
Z(s) = [ lim
s↓0
Q(s)−D1−1(0)−K1−1(0)
]
F ′(0) − [ lim
s↓0
q(s)− (D1−1 −K1−1)′(0)
]
F (0) = −∞,
since F (·) is positive and increasing, and all other terms are finite.
On the other hand, for s large enough and using that [5, Sec. 2]
lim
x↓d
F (x) = 0, lim
x↓d
G(x) = +∞, lim
x↑d¯
F (x) = +∞, lim
x↑d¯
G(x) = 0,
we have Q(s) ≈ D1+1(s), q(s) ≈ (D1+1)′(s) asymptotically as s ↑ d¯ and hence
Z(s) ≈ [D1+1(s)−D1−1(s)−K1−1(s¯)]F ′(s)− [D1′+1(s)−D1′−1(s)−K1′−1(s)]F (s),
=
[
− (D1+1(s)−D1−1(s)−K1−1(s)
F (s)
)′] · F 2(s) > 0.
The last inequality follows from ∆D := D1+1 −D1−1 −K1−1 ∈ Hinc (cf. definition A.1), thus
lim sup
s↑d¯
∆D(s)
F (s)
= 0,
∆D(s) > 0, for s large,
=⇒
(
∆D(s)
F (s)
)′
< 0 as s ↑ d¯.
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